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THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE FUTURE OF 
PRIVACY LAW IN MAINE 
Scott Bloomberg* 
ABSTRACT 
In the United States, privacy law has traditionally developed in concert with 
intrusions created by newfangled technologies.  This pattern has held true in Maine.  
Beginning in the late 1960s, the state has experienced three eras of privacy reform 
that track the technological advances of the mid-century, the internet era, and the 
new era of social media and big data.  This Article details these eras of reform and 
advances several proposals for responding to the challenges posed by the present era.  
Indeed, at the beginning of the 2020s, there is much work on the horizon to 
ensure that Maine’s privacy laws keep up with new technological and social 
developments.  The coronavirus pandemic looms large over all facets of society and 
privacy law is no exception.  The pandemic had made us even more reliant on online 
services that collect, use, and share previously unfathomable quantities of data, 
leaving residents’ personal information vulnerable to misuse.  Increased attention to 
racial injustice and over-policing in the wake of George Floyd’s tragic murder have 
likewise highlighted privacy issues with which Maine must continue to grapple.  
Finally, Northeastern University recently opened the Roux Institute in Portland, 
offering various graduate-level degrees pertaining to the practical application of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning in the digital and life sciences.  This 
development offers exciting educational and economic opportunities for the state, 
but also indicates that regulating AI and machine-learning technologies will be 
important to preserving Mainers’ privacy rights in the near future.  All of these recent 
challenges, moreover, have emerged against the backdrop of the existing privacy 
threats posed by social media, big data, mass surveillance, and more.   
This Article is thus well-timed to inform those who will be tasked with shaping 
Maine privacy law in the coming years and decades.  In Part II of the Article, I detail 
the three eras of reform highlighted above.  In Part III, I propose that Maine enact a 
general consumer privacy law endowing Mainers with certain rights to their personal 
information, vesting consumer privacy rulemaking authority in a state agency, 
regulating automated decision-making technologies, and more.  After proposing the 
general consumer privacy law, I identify five privacy threats that warrant additional 
attention from the legislature:  facial recognition technology; biometric information; 
smart-home devices; data brokers; and the Maine Information and Analysis Center.  
Part IV briefly concludes the Article.   
                                                                                                     
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.  I thank Cindy Hirsch for her 
excellent research assistance with this project, Stephen Stich and Brendan McQuade for their input on 
earlier drafts of this paper, the staff of the Maine Law Review for their superb editorial work, and Maine 
State Rep. Maggie O’Neil for introducing legislation that adopts many of this paper’s recommendations.  
Any errors are my own.  As always, I owe the deepest debt of gratitude to my wife, Amber, without 
whose support this paper would not have been possible.  Finally, I dedicate this Article to my daughter, 
Lyla.  May you grow up in a society that safeguards your privacy.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The body of privacy law in the United States is a mosaic of reforms enacted in 
response to privacy intrusions posed by technological advances.  This was true from 
the body’s ostensible birth in 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued 
for a right to privacy in light of the new cameras that had “invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life,” and the “numerous mechanical devices” that 
threatened to “make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall 
be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”1  By the 1960s, advances in technology 
promised to expose even the most intimate areas of life.  Gadgets like hidden cameras 
and discreet recording devices allowed eavesdroppers to capture conversations and 
images without being noticed, while inventions like the polygraph, personality tests, 
and subliminal messaging threatened to reveal the mind’s inner-workings.2  Local 
governments, state governments, and the federal government responded to these new 
technologies by adopting reforms that are now considered foundational to privacy 
law.3   
The expansion of the internet and mass-computing in the 1990s led to a 
multitude of new privacy issues regarding personal information.  Details once 
considered beyond public reach could be accessed, searched, organized, and stored 
by anyone with a desktop and a dial-up connection.  Threats to privacy caused by 
our new connectivity stirred legislatures to adopt laws governing unauthorized 
computer access, data breaches, cyber-harassment, and much more.4  Today, the 
ubiquity of social media, smart devices, big data, and machine learning have 
accelerated the privacy concerns attendant to computers and the internet that began 
to take hold in the 1990s.  Governments are still grappling with how best to respond 
to these new privacy risks. 
This pattern of privacy law has held true in Maine.  Since the late 1960s, the 
state has experienced three eras of privacy reform that track the technological 
advances of the mid-century, the internet era, and the new era of social media and 
big data.  This Article details these three eras of reform and advances a number of 
proposals for responding to the challenges posed by the era that we are living through 
today.   
Indeed, at the beginning of the 2020s, there is much work on the horizon to 
ensure that Maine’s privacy laws keep up with new technological and social 
developments.  The coronavirus pandemic looms large over all facets of society and 
privacy law is no exception.  The pandemic had made us even more reliant on online 
services that collect, use, and share previously unfathomable quantities of data, 
leaving residents’ personal information vulnerable to misuse.  Increased attention to 
                                                                                                     
 1.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 
(1890). 
 2.  See infra Section II(A).  See generally ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967) 
(detailing the privacy intrusions caused by post-WWII advances in technology and legislative responses 
to those new advances); SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN 
AMERICA (2018) (providing a history of how technology, science, and other factors have shaped 
American privacy norms and expectations). 
 3.  See infra Section II(A) (discussing reforms pertaining to eavesdropping, consumer reports, 
polygraphs, and wiretapping). 
 4.  See infra Section II(B). 
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racial injustice and over-policing in the wake of George Floyd’s tragic murder have 
likewise highlighted privacy issues with which Maine must continue to grapple.  
Finally, Northeastern University recently opened the Roux Institute in Portland, 
offering various graduate-level degrees pertaining to “the practical application of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning in the digital and life sciences.”5  This 
development offers exciting educational and economic opportunities for the state, 
but also indicates that regulating artificial intelligence (“AI”) and machine-learning 
technologies will be important to preserving Mainers’ privacy rights in the near 
future.  All of these recent challenges, moreover, have emerged against the backdrop 
of the existing privacy threats posed by social media, big data, mass surveillance, 
and more.   
This Article is thus well-timed to inform those who will be tasked with shaping 
Maine privacy law in the coming years and decades.  In Part II of the Article, I detail 
the three eras of reform highlighted above.  In Part III, I propose that Maine enact a 
general consumer privacy law endowing Mainers with certain rights to their personal 
information, vesting consumer privacy rulemaking authority in a state agency, 
regulating automated decision-making technologies, and more.  After proposing the 
general consumer privacy law, I identify five privacy threats that warrant additional 
attention from the legislature:  facial recognition technology; biometric information; 
smart-home devices; data brokers; and the Maine Information and Analysis Center.  
Part IV briefly concludes the Article.   
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVACY LAW IN MAINE 
Part II of this Article presents the first comprehensive account of the 
development of Maine privacy law.  I have organized this account into three 
Sections, each tracking a wave of reform that the state enacted in response to 
newfangled technologies.  First, I discuss the state’s reforms during the late 1960s 
and the 1970s.  These reforms include core privacy protections such as recognizing 
the invasion of privacy torts, criminalizing certain egregious violations of privacy, 
and regulating wiretapping.  Second, I detail Maine’s reforms during the 1990s and 
early 2000s, when the popularization of the internet and the personal computer 
(“PC”) led the state to update its earlier privacy laws and to enact new ones 
addressing the privacy threats posed by this new form of mass communication.  
Third, I review Maine’s more recent privacy reforms, which have primarily come in 
response to privacy risks posed by social media and big data.   
A. The Emergence of Privacy Law in Maine 
By the mid-1900s, advances in technology threatened to unveil even the most 
intimate areas of life.  Gadgets like miniature cameras, wiretaps, and discreet 
recording devices—which were marketed to the public as eavesdropping tools—
                                                                                                     
 5.  Ian Thomsen, Northeastern Partners with Entrepreneur David Roux to Launch the Roux 
Institute at Northeastern in Portland, Maine, NE. UNIV. (Jan. 27, 2020), https://news.northeastern.edu/ 
2020/01/27/northeastern-partners-with-entrepreneur-david-roux-to-launch-the-roux-institute-at-
northeastern-in-portland-maine/ [perma.cc/6EQ3-NBEG]. 
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allowed third parties to capture conversations and images without being noticed.6  At 
the same time as the privacy of traditionally non-public spaces and conversations 
was being threatened, inventions like the polygraph, personality tests, and subliminal 
messaging threatened to reveal Americans’ inner-most thoughts.7  Risks to 
information privacy began to take focus during this era as well.  Early data processing 
and computing technologies led the pioneering privacy scholar Alan Westin to warn 
against the privacy intrusions made possible by the collection and storage of large 
amounts of information about peoples’ daily lives.8   
Maine responded to these threats by enacting a series of privacy laws that often 
mirrored those passed in other states or at the federal level.  From the late 1960s to 
the late 1970s, the state passed laws addressing privacy issues attendant to 
telephones, recording devices, wiretaps, polygraphs, private investigators, and 
consumer reporting agencies.  Additionally, during this initial era of privacy reform 
in Maine, the Maine Law Court9 recognized four invasion of privacy torts that Maine 
residents would come to assert in a variety of circumstances.   
In 1967, Maine criminalized the “willful[], wanton[], or malicious[]” use of a 
telephone to transmit communications that were “obscene, lewd, lascivious, or 
indecent,” threated to injure “person or property,” or were repeated anonymous 
telephone calls “which disturb[ed] the peace, quiet or right of privacy of any 
person.”10  Maine’s “Act Prohibiting Annoying Telephone Calls” made the state one 
of many in the country to address the privacy intrusions attendant to the widespread 
use of telephones in the home:  telemarketers and harassers could reach into nearly 
anyone’s home at any hour of the day or night.11  Violations of the Act carried 
penalties of up to a $500 fine and eleven months’ imprisonment.12  Within two 
decades, almost every state in the country had similar laws on the books.13   
                                                                                                     
 6.  See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 2, at 73-85 (describing various location, photography, and 
eavesdropping technologies in use during the 1950s and 1960s). 
 7.  Id. at 158-69 (discussing government and private use of the polygraph during the 1950s and 
1960s); id. at 145-58 (discussing government and private use of the personality tests from the 1930s 
through the 1960s); id. at 311-31 (reviewing the invention of subliminal messaging, the public response 
thereto, and the debate over the invention’s effectiveness).  
 8.  See id. at ch. 7, The Revolution in Information Collection and Processing: Data Surveillance 
(discussing the use of computers and data processing to create large personal dossiers and to record 
financial transactions, and warning of the dangers posed by the use of centralized data processing 
technology to create a universal credit system).  
 9.  The Maine Supreme Judicial Court is called the “Law Court” when sitting in an appellate 
capacity.  See Supreme Judicial Court, STATE OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.courts.maine. 
gov/courts/sjc/index.html [https://perma.cc/NC79-TTRT] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 10.  Me. P.L. 1967, ch. 176. 
 11.  See Andrea J. Robinson, Note, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 VA. L. REV. 507, 522-
24 & n.75 (1984) (discussing statutes directed at combating telephonic harassment and noting that by 
1964 American Law Reports had published an annotation on misuse of the telephone as a minor 
criminal offense). 
 12.  Me. P.L. 1967, ch. 176. 
 13.  See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4 
YALE J. ON REGUL. 99, 106 (1986) (“Forty-five states have laws that prohibit harassment by telephone 
calls made with the purpose, intent, or knowledge that the call will annoy.”).  Another account from 
1984 concludes that every state had laws prohibiting “at least some types of telephone misuse.”  
Robinson, supra note 11, at 522 & App.  Many telephone harassment laws were declared 
unconstitutional based on First Amendment overbreadth or vagueness concerns, although courts are 
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Maine significantly revised the state’s annoying telephone calls law when the 
legislature enacted Maine’s criminal code in 1975.  Section 506 of the code 
prohibited harassment “by means of telephone,” and perhaps in response to 
constitutional challenges to similar laws in other states, provided a more tailored 
definition of that crime than did the 1967 Act.14  The revised law prohibited, inter 
alia:  obscene calls made “without consent of the person called”; anonymous calls 
made “with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass”; and repeated calls made with 
intent to harass.15   
Around the same time as Maine was adopting protections for recipients of 
annoying or harassing phone calls, the state also acted to protect those whose calls 
were being intercepted by third parties.  In 1973, Maine followed the federal 
government and several other states in enacting the Interception of Wire and Oral 
Communications Act.16  The Act protected the privacy of telephone (wire) and in-
person (oral) communications by criminalizing the interception of both types of 
communications.17  As a prophylactic measure to guard against this core privacy 
protection, the Act also prohibited the willful disclosure or use of communications 
known to have been unlawfully intercepted, as well as the possession and sale of 
devices used for intercepting wire and oral communications.18  And, the Act imposed 
an affirmative duty on telephone companies to report potential violations of the 
law.19   
The legislature enacted two significant privacy reforms during this era that 
extended beyond the confines of privacy intrusions caused by misuse of the 
telephone and to the realm of physical invasions of privacy.  First, in 1971 the state 
passed a law to regulate “professional investigators,” perhaps more commonly 
                                                                                                     
generally divided on the constitutionality of such statutes.  See generally M. Sean Royall, Comment, 
Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory Precision, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1403 (1989) (reviewing courts’ treatment of laws criminalizing annoying or harassing telephone 
calls under the First Amendment); Wayne F. Foster, Validity, Construction, and Application of State 
Criminal Statute Forbidding Use of Telephone to Annoy or Harass, 95 A.L.R.3d 411 (originally 
published in 1979) (collecting cases). 
 14.  An Act Creating the Maine Criminal Code, Me. P.L. 1975, ch. 499, § 1 (codified as amended at 
17-A M.R.S.A § 506(1)). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Me. P.L. 1973, ch. 561 (codified as amended at 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 709-712); see also Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (creating Chapter 
119 of title 18 of the U.S. Code, titled “Wire Interception and Interception of Oral Communications”); 
WESTIN, supra note 2, at 179-91 (discussing state wiretap reform laws in the 1950s and 1960s).  
Maine’s prohibition on intercepting oral and wire communications contained certain exceptions 
applicable to law enforcement and telephone companies.  See Me. P.L. 1973, ch. 561 (codified as 
amended at 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 710, 712). 
 17.  See Me. P.L. 1973, ch. 561(codified as amended at 15 M.R.S.A. § 710) (criminalizing the 
willful interception or attempted interception of oral or wire communications). 
 18.  See id.  The Act’s prohibitions are similar to the prohibitions contained in its federal 
counterpart.  See § 802, 82 Stat. at 212.  The scope of the Act’s prohibitions and exceptions have been 
modified since their original enactment, but remain largely the same as when they were originally 
enacted in 1973.  See 15 M.R.S. § 710 (2013) (using a “knowingly or intentionally” standard rather than 
a “willfully” standard and including certain exceptions for investigative officers and Department of 
Corrections employees). 
 19.  Me. P.L. 1973, ch 561 (codified as amended at 15 M.R.S.A. § 710(4)) (imposing a duty to 
report on communications common carriers). 
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known as private investigators or “P.I.s.”  By the late 1960s, approximately 20,000 
Americans were employed as P.I.s working for “their own firms, for large detective 
agencies, for insurance and credit companies, or as corporate security officers.”20  
Device manufacturers “aggressive[ly] promot[ed]” equipment such as “tapping 
devices, miniature microphones, and cameras” to P.I.s, who purchased these devices 
to surveil their targets.21  This technology gave P.I.s the ability to hide listening 
devices in objects as small as “cigarette lighters, clasps of ladies’ handbags and 
cigarette packs; two-inch ‘palm’ cameras; and similar equipment.”22  P.I.s also 
compiled personal information about their subjects by speaking to their subjects’ 
neighbors.  “Suburbia was a treasure trove of information for those with a financial 
stake in personal ‘character’ and habits . . . so agents roamed residential 
neighborhoods in search of peers who would talk.”23   
The growth of the P.I. industry and investigators’ use of such intrusive devices 
contributed to the genuine—and justified—paranoia about who may be watching, 
listening, or snooping on Americans.24  This paranoia led to both the enactment of 
state laws regulating private investigators and to the wiretapping laws discussed 
above.  Maine’s P.I. law, “An Act Relating to the Regulation of Private Detectives,” 
imposed a licensing requirement on P.I.s and prohibited P.I.s from taking certain 
actions to disrupt or incite labor strikes, interfere with labor negotiations, or attempt 
to break-up labor unions.25  Today, forty-five states have laws regulating and 
licensing P.I.s.26   
Second, the state created a violation of privacy crime in 1975.27  The law was 
designed to protect the privacy of people while they were in “private places,” defined 
to mean “a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from surveillance.”28  
The legislature accordingly made it a crime to trespass on property “with intent to 
overhear or observe any person in a private place,” to install or use “any device for 
                                                                                                     
 20.  WESTIN, supra note 2, at 97. 
 21.  See id. at 98. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  IGO, supra note 2, at 114. 
 24.  See, e.g., id. at 114 (“The sudden uptick in the use of private investigators (in the 1950s) was of 
special concern.”).  
 25.  See Me. P.L. 1971, ch. 582, § 1 (codified as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. § 3809 (repealed 1977)) 
(listing prohibited conduct). 
 26. See State-by-State Private Investigator Licensing Requirements, PURSUIT MAG., https:// 
pursuitmag.com/resources/investigator-licensing/ [https://perma.cc/5UFG-SPVY] (last visited Nov. 15, 
2020) (compiling state licensing requirements). 
 27.  An Act Creating the Maine Criminal Code, Me. P.L. 1975, ch. 499 (codified as amended at 17-
A M.R.S.A.).  For an overview of state laws criminalizing similar invasions of privacy, see Lance E. 
Rothenberg, Comment, Re-Thinking Privacy: Peeping Toms, Video Voyeurs, and Failure of the 
Criminal Law to Recognize a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Public Space, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 
1127, 1142-44 (2000), noting that “the criminalization of privacy intrusion is firmly established in many 
state penal codes, falling under a wide variety of crimes,” and collecting state statutes regarding 
different types of privacy intrusions. 
 28.  Me. P.L. 1975, ch. 499, § 1 (codified as amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 511).  The definition of 
“private place” exempted “a place to which the public or a substantial group has access.”  The law thus 
did not protect the privacy of conversations that occurred in places like bars and restaurants, even if it 
would have been reasonable to expect privacy from surveillance in such places.  As discussed infra 
Section II(B), the legislature would remove this exception and revise the definition of “private places” 
decades later. 
222 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
observing, photographing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds or events” 
in private places without consent, and to install or use outside of a private place 
devices designed for “hearing, recording, amplifying or broadcasting sounds 
originating” from the private place.29   
The state also acted to regulate the use of polygraphs, which not only posed 
challenging problems for criminal procedure30 but were also commonly used to pry 
and embarrass women and suspected homosexuals about their intimate thoughts and 
behaviors.  By the 1960s, polygraph testing was widely used by police departments 
and federal agencies for investigative purposes.31  Commercial uses of the polygraph 
had grown in popularity too.  Beyond using polygraphs to investigate commercial 
crimes such as embezzlement, companies and government employers required 
prospective employees to take polygraph exams and subjected existing employees to 
periodic polygraphs to deter misconduct.32  Tests were given in the employment 
context to vet employees for promotions, assess employee attitudes about co-
workers, and to determine how happy workers were with their jobs.33  Government 
employees, and employees of government contractors, were additionally subjected 
to “loyalty checks” using polygraph machines.34   
The content covered in these tests was wide-ranging and intrusive.  For example, 
in the 1950s the National Security Agency (“NSA”) made it a practice to use an 
“Embarrassing Personal Question” or “EPQ” technique to vet prospective 
employees.35  Common questions directed to women reportedly included “[h]ave you 
ever slept with a man?” and “[d]id you sleep with your husband before you were 
married?”36  During Congressional hearings on the use of polygraph examinations in 
1964, one congressman recounted the story of a seventeen-year-old typist at the 
NSA, who “became quite disturbed when she was asked a series of questions about 
homosexual activity by the male operator administering the test while the two were 
alone in the polygraph examining room.”37  Private-sector employers abused the new 
technology as well, using polygraph tests to ask employees about “union activities, 
                                                                                                     
 29.  Me. P.L. 1975, ch 499, § 1 (codified as amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 511).  The statute 
exempted people acting “in the execution of a public duty or as authorized by law.”  Id. § 1 (codified as 
amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 511(1)). 
 30.  As early as 1954, the Law Court had “consistently ruled that not only are polygraph tests 
inadmissible, but also that evidence that a defendant agreed to take a polygraph test, or refused to take 
such test, is not admissible.”  State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 283 (Me. 1975) (citing State v. Casale, 
110 A.2d 588 (Me. 1954); State v. Mottram, 184 A.2d 225 (Me. 1962); State v. Mower, 314 A.2d 840 
(Me. 1974)). 
 31.  See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 2, at 158-59 (estimating that over half of the police departments 
in the United States were using polygraphs and noting that in 1963 thirteen federal agencies 
administered a total of 12,000 polygraph tests). 
 32.  See id. at 160-63 (discussing the widespread use of polygraph examinations for personnel 
sorting in private industry); id. at 164-69 (discussing how local, state, and the federal government used 
polygraphs for employment purposes). 
 33.  See generally id. at 160-169 (discussing the polygraph’s use as a personnel sorter). 
 34.  Id. at 161 (noting that polygraphs were used by government contractors to administer polygraph 
examinations); id. at 165-67 (summarizing a polygraph examination given to a prospective NSA 
employee that probed the subject’s sympathies toward communism). 
 35.  Id. at 167. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 168. 
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personal finances, past employment and future job plans, drinking habits, physical 
condition, police record, driving habits, sexual activities, and political beliefs.”38   
These disturbing abuses led states to begin restricting the use of polygraph tests.  
By 1966, ten states had banned the use of polygraphs as a condition of employment, 
while six other states had enacted licensing requirements for polygraph examiners.39    
Maine followed these early-moving states in 1979 by enacting the “Act to 
Establish Registration of Polygraph Examiners.”40  The Act made it unlawful for 
polygraph examiners to “ask any questions pertaining to sexual behavior of any type 
or questions that could be construed as being sexually oriented,” to “probe the 
political or religious beliefs of any individual,” and to “subject a person to a 
polygraph examination without that person’s full knowledge and consent.”41  The 
Act further prohibited the use of polygraphs for preemployment screening and for 
employment purposes.42  The grounds for revoking or suspending a license provided 
additional privacy protections for subjects of polygraph examinations.43  Examiners 
were subject to penalties against their license for failing to disclose the nature of the 
examination and the specific questions to be asked; that the examination was 
voluntary; that the subject had rights to refuse and terminate the examination; that 
the subject had a constitutional right against self-incrimination; for asking prohibited 
sexual questions; for not giving the subject an opportunity to offer explanations for 
their responses; for conducting an examination to interfere with or prevent the lawful 
activities of a labor union; and more.44   
Toward the end of this initial era of privacy reform in Maine, the legislature 
enacted the Maine Fair Credit Reporting Act (“Maine FCRA”), the first law in the 
state that attempted to tackle privacy intrusions caused by the amassing and analysis 
of large quantities of personal information by the private sector.45  By the 1970s, 
advances in computing and data-processing technologies had allowed commercial 
actors to collect and compile information files on consumers for use in determining 
credit-worthiness, insurability, eligibility for employment, and more.46  The agencies 
                                                                                                     
 38.  Id. at 243. 
 39.  See id. at 244, 251 (noting that by 1965, Massachusetts, Oregon, Rhode Island, California, 
Washington, and Alaska had banned the use of polygraph tests in employment, while New Jersey, 
Maryland, Hawaii, and Delaware followed suit in 1966); id. at 246 (stating that Illinois, Kentucky, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, and Texas had established licensing laws by 1966). 
 40.  An Act to Establish Registration of Polygraph Examiners, Me. P.L. 1979, ch. 209, § 2 (codified 
as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 7351-7390). 
 41.  See id. (codified as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. § 7154).  The prohibition on asking sexual 
questions contains exceptions for certain criminal investigations and civil litigation where sexual 
behavior is at issue.  Id. 
 42.  Id. (codified as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. § 7166). 
 43.  Id. (codified as amended at 32 M.R.S.A. § 7161). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  An Act to Establish the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Me. P.L. 1977, ch. 514, amended by An Act 
to Clarify and Define Certain Existing Provisions of the Maine Fair Credit Reporting Act, Me. P.L. 
1977, ch. 677. 
 46.  See, e.g., Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) 
(noting that in enacting the FCRA, “Congress understood how the computerization of personal 
information estranged individuals from their personal information, leading to a loss of control over 
data”). 
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that prepared these consumer reports were largely unregulated.47  Information from 
their reports could be obtained through “deliberate misrepresentation,” files could 
contain “false or fabricated material,” and consumers would have no recourse when 
they were denied financial services or employment based on the contents of their 
files.48  Indeed, consumers were often left in the dark about what information their 
report contained, the basis for any adverse action taken due to information contained 
in the report, and even the very existence of a report.49  Consumer reporting agencies 
were thus widely seen as “unaccountable gatekeepers”50 sorely in need of regulation.   
Maine took action against the consumer reporting industry in 1977, seven years 
after the federal government enacted the era’s first and only federal law to “rein in 
private sector data practices”51:  the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 
(“Federal FCRA”).52  Finding it necessary to “insure that consumer reporting 
agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect 
for the consumer’s right to privacy,” Congress passed the Federal FCRA to create 
some basic transparency requirements and safeguards for consumers.53  The Federal 
FCRA limited the purposes for which a consumer report could be used;54 restricted 
agencies’ use of older adverse information;55 established requirements for disclosing 
information to consumers;56 created a procedure for consumers to dispute the 
accuracy of information contained in a report;57 and imposed disclosure obligations 
on users of reports when they made a decision adverse to the consumer based on the 
contents of a report.58   
Maine’s FCRA largely mirrored the federal version but provided the state’s 
                                                                                                     
 47.  See, e.g., Christopher P. Guzelian et al., Credit Scores, Lending, and Psychosocial Disability, 
95 B.U. L. REV. 1807, 1811 (2015) (“Until 1970, CRAs were unregulated. Complaints of abusive, 
opaque, and false estimations of creditworthiness which affected banks' and merchants' lending 
decisions were widespread, despite consumers' growing reliance upon credit to provide staples of daily 
life.”); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
1695, 1744-45 (2012) (“In passing the FCRA, Congress sought to correct key defects in the procedures 
by which the previously unregulated credit reporting industry operated.  The industry was secretive and 
enigmatic.  Consumers did not know when and by whom their credit reports were being utilized.  
Consumers had no access to their consumer reports.  In addition, they could not correct incomplete, 
irrelevant, or obsolete information.”). 
 48.  IGO, supra note 2, at 229. 
 49.  See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 47, at 1745 (describing consumer reporting agencies’ poor 
practices and commenting that “job applicants had no idea that adverse and frequently erroneous or 
subjective information in their consumer reports might be ‘controlling their troubled careers’”). 
 50.  IGO, supra note 2, at 229. 
 51.  Id. (referring to the FCRA as the era’s only law regulating private-sector data practices). 
 52.  See Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189, 192-94 (Me. 1980) (summarizing the federal 
and state acts and concluding that “the Maine Act paralleled the Federal Act,” with some exceptions); 
see also Pub. L. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1127-36 (1970) (amending the Consumer Credit 
Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968)). 
 53.  Pub. L. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) ( “Findings and purpose”). 
 54.  Id. § 604 (limiting use of consumer reports to credit transactions, employment purposes, 
insurance, certain government licenses and benefits, and other “legitimate businesses need[s]”). 
 55.  Id. § 605 (prohibiting consumer reporting agencies from using older information such as 
bankruptcies older than fourteen years old or tax liens older than seven years). 
 56.  See id. §§ 606, 609, 610 (establishing several disclosure requirements).  
 57.  Id. § 611. 
 58.  Id. § 615(a) (requiring, in such situations, users to disclose the name and address of the 
consumer reporting agency and the nature of adverse information contained in a report to consumers). 
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residents with some additional privacy protections.  As the Law Court explained in 
Equifax Services v. Cohen:   
Whereas the Federal Act requires specific notice be given to a consumer before a 
user can procure an “investigative consumer report,”[59] the Maine Act prohibits a 
user from procuring such a report until prior written authorization of the consumer 
is obtained.  In addition, the Maine Act provides for many more absolute 
prohibitions against the reporting of information.  Whole categories of information, 
such as race, religion, political affiliation and beliefs, and so forth, are classified as 
prohibited and to be excluded from reports. . . . Maine requires that “investigative 
consumer reports be written”, whereas the Federal Act allows them to be oral.  The 
Maine Act fails to confer the qualified immunity given by the Federal Act relative 
to consumer suits against designated persons for defamation, invasion of privacy or 
negligence with respect to the reporting of information.60   
In Equifax Services, the Law Court reviewed a series of challenges to the Maine 
FCRA brought by the credit reporting agency Equifax.  Maine’s attempts to provide 
its residents with protections beyond what the Federal FCRA provided received a 
mixed airing.  The Law Court upheld Maine’s requirement that investigative 
consumer reports be written,61 and it upheld the state’s decision not to confer 
qualified immunity upon consumer reporting agencies, persons who furnish 
information to such agencies, and users of consumer reports.62  However, the court 
found that the Maine FCRA’s provision requiring users to obtain a subject’s consent 
before using an investigative consumer report—rather than requiring the user to only 
notify the subject, as the Federal FCRA required—violated the First Amendment’s 
speech clause.63  In reaching this decision, the Law Court rejected the Attorney 
General’s position that the government’s interest in protecting privacy justified the 
consent requirement.  The court opined that privacy is “an elusive concept,” and that 
only particular “‘zones’ or ‘areas’” of privacy fall within the government’s 
“substantial” interest in protecting privacy.64  The privacy protected by requiring 
users to obtain consent from the subject of a consumer report before using that report 
did not justify the restraints on speech imposed by the requirement.65   
The Equifax Services court similarly found that the Maine FCRA’s prohibition 
on the use of the sensitive information listed in 10 M.R.S.A. § 1321 implicated First 
Amendment speech rights and was not justified by a sufficient government interest.66  
                                                                                                     
 59.  An investigative consumer report is a specific type of consumer report that includes 
information “bearing on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics or mode of 
living which is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends or associates.”  Me. P.L. 
1977, ch. 514 (codified as amended at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1312(7) (repealed 2013)). 
 60.  Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Cohen, 420 A.2d 189, 193-94 (Me. 1980) (internal citations omitted). 
 61.  Id. at 212. 
 62.  Id. at 213-15.  
 63.  Id. at 200 (“Section 1314(1) must be held unconstitutional because either:  (1) the restraint it 
imposes really does not at all further a substantial governmental interest or (2) if we acknowledge that 
the restraint may have a degree of relation to a substantial governmental interest . . . the restraint does 
not directly advance that substantial interest and is more extensive than is necessary to serve it.”). 
 64.  Id. at 199-200. 
 65.  Id. at 200. 
 66.  See id. at 195 (concluding that “[s]ections 1314 and 1321 . . . [are] direct restrictions upon 
speech based upon the content of that speech”). 
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Although it would be illegal for the user of a credit report to rely on some of the 
categories of information proscribed by section 1321—such as race and religion—
in making decisions regarding creditworthiness, employment, housing, and public 
accommodation, it was not illegal for a consumer agency to report those 
characteristics.67  Nor was it illegal for a user to be aware of those characteristics.  
As the court concluded, “[i]t is only when the user bases a discriminatory decision 
on such factors that illegal activity occurs, and nothing in evidence shows that users 
are generally susceptible to improper influence merely by becoming aware of 
them.”68   
Beyond statutory reforms, the Law Court created significant common-law 
protections for individual privacy during this era.  In Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 
the court formally recognized a “right to privacy” and declared that violation of the 
“legally protected right is an actionable tort.”69  In doing so, the Law Court joined a 
majority of other states in recognizing the four privacy torts that derive from 
Brandeis and Warren’s seminal article, “The Right to Privacy.”70  As the court 
explained:   
The law of privacy addresses the invasion of four distinct interests of the individual.  
Each of the four different interests, taken as a whole, represent an individual's right 
‘to be let alone.’  These four kinds of invasion are:   
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical and mental solitude or seclusion; 
(2) public disclosure of private facts; 
(3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 
(4) appropriation for the defendant’s benefit or advantage of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness.71 
Plaintiffs in Maine have since asserted the torts—usually unsuccessfully in 
reported cases—in a range of situations, including:  the unauthorized publication of 
an infant child’s photograph;72 portraying a corporation in false light;73 the disclosure 
of settlement terms;74 the unauthorized viewing of a woman giving birth;75 the 
disclosure and use of private information during probate proceedings;76 and 
                                                                                                     
 67.  See id. at 203, 204-05. 
 68.  Id. at 205. 
 69.  365 A.2d 792, 794 (Me. 1976). 
 70.  Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 794 (Me. 1976) (noting that a majority of other 
jurisdictions in the country had recognized the privacy rights); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. 
REV. 383, 389 (1960) (dividing Brandeis and Warren’s proposed invasion of privacy tort into four 
distinct torts). 
 71.  Estate of Berthiaume, 365 A.2d at 795. 
 72.  Nelson v. Me. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1222 (Me. 1977) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs’ 
claims). 
 73.  Hearts With Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, No. 2:13-CV-00039, 2015 WL 3649592, at * 8 (D. Me. 
June 9, 2015) (finding that the Law Court would not allow a corporation to bring a false light invasion 
of privacy claim). 
 74.  Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 1991) (affirming dismissal of invasion 
of privacy claim). 
 75.  Knight v. Penobscot Bay Med. Ctr., 420 A.2d 915, 917-18 (Me. 1980).  The jury in this case 
found for the defendants and the Law Court affirmed the trial court’s jury instructions on appeal.  Id. at 
916. 
 76.  Bratt v. Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, P.A., No. 2:17-CV-463, 2018 WL 4568590, at * 1 (D. 
Me. Sept. 24, 2018) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
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By the end of the 1970s, Maine had established basic safeguards from the 
intrusions on its residents’ privacy posed by the technologies of the day.  People who 
invaded the sanctity of the home through repeated or harassing phone calls or by 
employing discreet surveillance devices could be prosecuted under criminal laws.  
The state’s prohibition on intercepting wire and oral communications and its 
regulation of private investigators, polygraph examiners, and consumer reporting 
agencies combined to guard Mainers against the use of intrusive, unfair, and 
unethical practices in collecting personal information.  And, the Law Court’s 
recognition of the four privacy torts gave Mainers civil recourse against individuals 
and companies who violated their right to privacy.   
Within a decade, advances in technology would reveal a clear need to 
supplement these foundational privacy protections.   
B. Reforms for the Internet Era 
The expansion of the internet and mass-computing beginning around 1990 and 
extending through the early 2010s led to increased awareness of privacy issues 
regarding personal information.  Information that was once considered beyond 
public reach was suddenly available to anyone with computer and internet access, 
large quantities of personal information could be readily stored in hackable electronic 
databases, and private information could be posted and shared on publicly available 
forums without the subject’s consent.  Maine’s laws, like the laws of its sister states 
and the federal government, were not equipped to protect its residents’ privacy 
interests from these new threats.  The sometimes obvious shortcomings, together 
with well-publicized privacy intrusions from around the country, prompted the state 
to act.  During this second era of privacy reform in Maine, the state passed laws 
criminalizing the unauthorized access of a computer, prohibiting cyberstalking, 
expanding the state’s criminal invasion of privacy law, requiring businesses (and 
certain other persons) to report data breaches, prohibiting the sale of consumers’ cell 
phone records, and more.   
The beginning of the state’s internet-era reforms can be marked by Maine’s 1990 
enactment of Chapter 18 of the criminal code:  “Computer Crimes.”78  The Chapter 
included two crimes.  First, a person was guilty of “criminal invasion of computer 
privacy” if they “intentionally access[ed] any computer resource knowing that [they 
                                                                                                     
 77.  Stokes v. Barnhart, 257 F. Supp. 2d 288, 295 (D. Me. 2003) (dismissing the claim because the 
defendant only disclosed the plaintiff’s HIV status to a single person). 
 78.  Me. P.L. 1989, ch. 620.  Previous versions of this bill died in the legislature after some 
commenters voiced concerns that the prohibitions on unauthorized computer access swept too broadly.  
See An Act Relating to Computer Access: Hearing on L.D. 627 Before the J. Standing Comm. on 
Judiciary, 114th Legis. 13-19 (1989) (detailing the opposition to a similar bill, L.D. 36 (1985)), 
available from Me. State Law & Leg. Reference Library by requesting cf114-LD-0627.pdf. 
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were] not authorized to do so.”79  Second, a person was guilty of “aggravated 
criminal invasion of computer privacy” if they knowingly:  (a) copied any computer 
program, software, or information without authorization; (b) damaged any computer 
resource without having the right to do so; or (c) introduced a virus into a computer 
without having the right to do so.80  At the time of enactment, at least twenty-three 
other states had similar laws on the books.81   
Stalking is one of the most serious privacy intrusions people experience, and the 
use of computers and the internet exacerbates the problem.  Beginning in 1990, states 
across the country began enacting laws that made stalking a specific criminal 
offense.82  Although Maine had other laws, such as a law prohibiting terrorizing, that 
may have encompassed some stalking behavior, the state did not recognize stalking 
as a separate offense until 1996, becoming the last state in the nation to do so.83  
Maine’s stalking statute followed the National Institute of Justice’s Model Anti-
Stalking Code for States,84 criminalizing the following conduct:   
1.  A person is guilty of stalking if:   
A.  The person intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed 
at another specific person that would in fact cause a reasonable person:   
(1) To suffer intimidation or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm;  
(2) To fear bodily injury or to fear bodily injury to a member of that person’s 
immediate family; or  
(3) To fear death or to fear the death of a member of that person’s immediate 
family; and  
B.  The person’s course of conduct in fact causes the other specific person [to suffer 
those harms].85   
Importantly, the statute defined “course of conduct” to encompass “gaining 
unauthorized access to personal, medical, financial or other identifying information, 
including access by computer network.”86  An interview with the bill’s sponsor, 
                                                                                                     
 79.  Me. P.L. 1989, ch. 620 (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 432).  The term “computer resources” was 
defined to encompass computer programs, software, systems, networks, and information.  Id. (codified 
as amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 431). 
 80.  Id. (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 433). 
 81.  An Act Relating to Computer Access: Hearing on L.D. 627 Before the J. Standing Comm. on 
Judiciary, 114th Leg. 6 (Me. 1989). 
 82.  NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STALKING, AND 
ANTISTALKING LEGISLATION: AN ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN ACT 1 (1996) (“The first State antistalking laws were passed in 1990.”). 
 83.  See Me. P.L. 1995, ch. 668, § 3 (creating the offense of stalking); NAT’L INST. OF JUST., supra 
note 82, at 7 (noting that Maine used an anti-terrorizing statute to address stalking behavior); 6 Legis. 
Rec. H-1857 (2d Reg. Sess. 1996) (remarks of Representative Saxl) (stating that “49 other states in this 
country saw fit to adopt legislation which would identify stalking as a crime”).  Notably, the Office of 
the Maine Attorney General disputed the characterization that Maine was the last state in the country to 
criminalize stalking, apparently believing that Maine’s anti-terrorizing statute or its laws regarding 
protective orders encompassed the criminal offense.  See Renee Ordway, Legislator pushing bill on 
stalking, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Jan. 10, 1996), https://archive.bdnblogs.com/1996/01/10/legislator-
pushing-bill-on-stalking-act-would-become-crime/ [https://perma.cc/43BH-WFAA]. 
 84.  See Nat’l Crim. Just. Ass’n, PROJECT TO DEVELOP A MODEL ANTI-STALKING CODE FOR 
STATES, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Oct. 1993). 
 85.  Me. P.L. 1995, ch. 668, § 3 (codified as amended at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 210-A). 
 86.  Id. 
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Representative Saxl, shows that the legislature was particularly concerned with how 
advances in computer technologies would facilitate stalking.  Saxl remarked that the 
anti-stalking legislation would “make it a crime to invade the lives of victims via 
computer; by using computer mail or other computer-aided ways to invade a person’s 
bank records, credit card statements and the like, and then using that type of 
information in the harassment of the individual.”87  He also noted that such problems 
“have occurred in Maine already,” and he anticipated the problem would worsen 
with “increased computer access.”88   
The legislature would return to the anti-stalking law twice during this era of 
reform.  Both times, the legislature amended the law to account for the use of new 
technologies to stalk victims in Maine.  The 2001 Act to Prohibit Cyberstalking 
clarified that Maine’s stalking law prohibited the conveyance of oral or written 
threats by “electronic means.”89  Then, as part of a larger legislative effort to 
strengthen the state’s anti-stalking law in 2007-2008, the legislature redefined 
“course of conduct” to include “2 or more acts, including but not limited to acts in 
which the actor, by any action, method, device or means, directly or indirectly 
follows, monitors, tracks, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses or communicates to 
or about a person or interferes with a person’s property.”90  The bill also included a 
legislative intent section to explain that the revisions were:   
drafted broadly to capture all stalking activity, including a stalker’s use of new 
technologies.  Presently, some stalkers use Global Positioning Satellite technology 
to monitor actions, disposable cell phones to make untraceable calls and keyloggers 
to capture private information from computers.  In the future, new technologies not 
currently imagined will be used to the same ends.  The Legislature intends that the 
use of such new technology be covered by this legislation.91   
Maine also revised its Criminal Invasion of Privacy law to account for changes 
in technology during this time.  In 1996, police arrested a Lisbon man who had 
surreptitiously taken up-skirt videos of women and girls at a bookstore and in other 
public places.92  The man had jerry-rigged a briefcase to camouflage a small video 
camera, which he would place on the ground near where his victims were standing.93  
The incident posed a problem for prosecutors:  the criminal invasion of privacy 
statute only applied to “private places” and the man’s conduct did not fit into any 
other crime enumerated by the state’s criminal code.94  While the man was eventually 
convicted for criminal invasion of privacy after the judge stretched the statute to 
                                                                                                     
 87.  Ordway, supra note 83. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Me. P.L. 2001, ch, 411, § 1. 
 90.  Me. P.L. 2007, ch. 685, § 1. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See Robert George, Bill Targets High-tech Lewdness, BRUNSWICK TIMES REC. 2 (Feb. 2, 
1997), available from Me. State Law & Leg. Reference Library by requesting 118/LD00xx/nc118-
LD0036/SB118640.pdf. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  See An Act to Criminalize Unpermitted Visual Surveillance under the Clothing of a Person in a 
Public Place by Mechanical or Electronic Equipment: Hearing on L.D. 0036 Before J. Standing Comm. 
on Criminal Justice, 118th Legis. 9-10 (1997) (letter from Assistant Dist. Att. Carlos Diaz to victim’s 
mother), available from Me. State Law & Leg. Reference Library by requesting cf118-LD-036.pdf. 
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reach his conduct,95 the legislature was concerned that the case revealed a gap in the 
criminal code caused by the advance in video-recording technology.  The state thus 
added a new clause to its criminal invasion of privacy statute, making it a crime to 
engage:   
in visual surveillance in a public place by means of mechanical or electronic 
equipment with the intent to observe or photograph, or record, amplify or broadcast 
an image of any portion of the body of another person present in that place when 
that portion of the body is in fact concealed from public view under clothing and a 
reasonable person would expect it to be safe from surveillance.96   
The legislature would amend the criminal invasion of privacy statute twice more 
during this era to provide additional privacy protections to Mainers.  First, increased 
use of surveillance cameras in retail establishments prompted the legislature to 
specify that “private place” as defined by the statute included “changing or dressing 
rooms, bathrooms and similar places.”97  Second, the legislature removed the 
exception for places “to which the public or a substantial group has access” from the 
definition of “private place,” such that a criminal invasion of privacy could occur by 
conducting surveillance on someone while they are in a publicly accessible area, 
provided that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that area.98   
To give its internet-era stalking and invasion of privacy reforms more teeth, 
Maine added both crimes to the list of offenses that allow a victim to obtain a 
Harassment Prevention Order.99  Maine’s Protection from Harassment statute, 5 
M.R.S.A. §§ 4651-61, allows victims of harassment to obtain emergency protective 
orders.  The term “harassment” is defined to encompass several specific offenses—
which now include stalking and criminal invasion of privacy.  The statute specifies 
that a victim can obtain the order “in the District Court of the division in which either 
the plaintiff or the defendant resides,” giving victims recourse when their harasser 
resides outside of the state and torments them through the internet.100   
Beyond reforms to protect new intrusions on physical privacy made possible by 
advances in computing and other technologies, Maine took several measures to 
protect its residents’ information privacy from new and emerging threats.  In 2005, 
a data broker101 called ChoicePoint experienced a security breach that exposed 
thousands of consumers’ personal information, including approximately 250 
                                                                                                     
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Me. P.L. 1997, ch. 467, § 1.  The legislature also provided an affirmative defense to this new 
crime for situations where the person was over 14 years old and consented to the surveillance.  The 
legislative materials that I have reviewed do not reveal why the legislature chose 14 years old as the 
pertinent age of consent for this incredibly intrusive conduct, but that provision remains the law today.  
17-A M.R.S.A. § 511(1-A) (2016). 
 97.  Me. P.L. 1999, ch. 116, § 1. 
 98.  Me. P.L. 2007, ch. 688, § 2 (amending the definition of “private place” as follows:  “As used in 
this section, "private place" means a place where one may reasonably expect to be safe from 
surveillance, including, but not limited to, changing or dressing rooms, bathrooms and similar places, 
but excluding a place to which the public or a substantial group has access.”). 
 99.  Me. P.L. 2001, ch. 134, § 1. 
 100.  See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4652 (2004). 
 101.  For more information on data brokers, see infra Section III(B) (proposing that Maine regulate 
data brokers by creating a data broker registry and giving consumers greater control over how data 
brokers use their personal information). 
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Mainers.102  This event drew the legislature’s attention to the growing problem of 
data breaches and the risk of identity theft that results.103  The legislature responded 
to the incident by enacting a breach-notification law:  “An Act To Protect Maine 
Citizens from Identity Theft.”104  The Act applied only to “information brokers”—
companies that collected consumers’ personal information and then furnished that 
information to third parties—and required such companies to notify Maine 
consumers upon discovery of a data breach involving their personal information.105  
Violations of the Act were subject to civil penalties that could be enforced by the 
Department of Professional and Financial Regulation (“DPFR”) or by the Attorney 
General.106  The Act also required the DPFR to issue a report on data security and 
security breaches to inform future changes to the Act.107   
The DPFR’s report contained two key recommendations.  First, the report 
advised that the Act be expanded to apply to all businesses (and certain other 
persons)—not just information brokers.108  Second, the report recommended 
establishing a “limited private cause of action” for actual damages caused by the 
failure to investigate or timely notify consumers of a breach.109  Maine swiftly 
amended the breach notification law to adopt the former recommendation, but the 
provision creating a limited private cause of action was removed in committee.110  
To this day, there is no private action for violations of Maine’s breach notification 
law.111   
                                                                                                     
 102.  See ME. DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL, REP. OF THE DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL. TO THE JOINT 
STANDING COMM. ON INS. AND FIN. SERVS. ON P.L. 2005, CH. 379 “AN ACT TO PROTECT MAINE 
CITIZENS FROM IDENTITY THEFT” 1 (2006), http://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/Meta/LegHist/122/lh1 
22-LD-1671.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4UW-UXZ4] [hereinafter ME. DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL. REP.]. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Me. P.L. 2005, ch. 379. 
 105.  Id. § 1. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See ME. DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL. REP., supra note 102, at 6, 12.  The report also 
recommended that the state maintain more stringent notification requirements for information brokers.  
Id. at 12.  The State adopted that recommendation by requiring information brokers to provide notice 
following a breach where a consumer’s “personal information has been, or is reasonably believed to 
have been, acquired by an unauthorized person,” while subjecting other businesses to the ostensibly 
lower standard of having to provide notice only when “misuse” of the personal information has occurred 
or is “reasonably possible” to occur.  10 M.R.S.A. § 1348(1)(A)-(B).  This distinction was likely more 
imaginary than real, as misuse is almost always “reasonably possible” when an unauthorized personal 
acquires a person’s personal information. 
 109.  ME. DEP’T OF PRO. & FIN. REGUL. REP., supra note 102, at 12. 
 110.  L.D. 2017, § 12 (122d Legis. 2006) (codified at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1350) (proposing a private right 
of action).  The legislature subsequently made minor revisions to strengthen its breach notification law 
in 2007, 2009, and 2019.  See Me. P.L. 2009, ch. 634, § 1 (codified at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1350-B) (requiring 
law enforcement to issue police reports to persons whose personal information may have been misused 
in a data breach); Me. P.L 2009, ch. 161, § 1 (codified at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1347(1)) (expanding the 
definition of a security breach); Me. P.L. 2019, ch. 512, § 1 (codified at 10 M.R.S.A. § 1347(5)) 
(applying the law to municipalities and school administrative units). 
 111.  See 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1346-1350-B (2006); see also In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data 
Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 125 (D. Me. 2009) (noting that Maine’s breach notification 
statute “does not recognize any private recovery.”).  The State’s efforts to protect its residents from the 
threat of identity theft posed by new computer technologies continued in 2007, when the legislature 
enacted “An Act to Help Prevent Identity Theft.”  Me. P.L. 2007, ch. 626 (codified at 33 M.R.S.A. 
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Maine also took aim at the unauthorized sale of residents’ cell phone information 
during this era.  By 2005, some data brokers were acquiring and offering for sale 
records of calls made to and from consumers’ cell phones.  Maine law already 
prohibited the sale of such records for landlines, but as Maine State Senator Bartlett 
remarked on the Senate floor, “technology got a couple of steps ahead of us.”112  The 
legislature thus passed the “Cellular Telephone Customer Privacy Act” to provide 
civil and criminal penalties for selling, disclosing, or offering to sell or disclose call 
records and other cell-phone information.113   
Maine proved to be ahead of the curve on this issue.  In 2006, the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce began investigating the 
“activities of Internet-based data brokers who use lies, fraud, and deception to 
procure . . . customer proprietary network information (CPNI) that is compiled by 
cell phone carriers.”114  The Committee soon learned that investigators hired by the 
Hewlett Packard Company (“HP”) to look into a boardroom leak used a data broker 
to obtain cell phone call records of board members and reporters.115  This revelation, 
and the Committee’s broader investigation into data brokers’ practices, led to three 
Committee hearings on data brokers’ collection of personal information,116 criminal 
charges against HP’s chairwoman (which were eventually dropped),117 and a $14.5 
million settlement with the State of California.118  The incident also led the federal 
government to enact the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, 
prohibiting the fraudulent access of phone records and the unauthorized sale of such 
records.119   
The end of this era of privacy reform in Maine can be marked by two 2011 bills 
designed to update Maine’s laws to account for the increased use of computers in 
harassment.  First, Maine’s 1975 law on annoying telephone calls, discussed supra 
Section I(A), was badly in need of updating because, by the 2000s, harassing calls 
were often placed from computers and not telephones.  The legislature thus amended 
section 506 of the criminal code to cover harassment “by electronic communication 
device,” which it defined to include “any software capable of sending and receiving 
communication.”120  Second, the national—and indeed global—nature of internet 
privacy intrusions led the state to amend its criminal invasion of computer privacy 
                                                                                                     
§651-B).  This sensible piece of legislation allowed individuals to request that certain personal 
information (social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, financial account numbers, and the like) 
be redacted from records accessible through a registry of deeds website.  Id. § 1. 
 112.  Legis. Rec. S-1831 (2d Reg. Sess. 2006) (remarks of Sen. Bartlett). 
 113.  Me. P.L. 2005, ch. 582. 
 114.  Letter from Comm. on Energy & Com., to Patricia Dunn, Chairwoman of the Bd. of Hewlett-
Packard Co. 1 (Sept. 11, 2006), https://web.archive.org/web/20061107225224/http://i.n.com.com/pdf/ 
ne/2006/househp_letter.pdf. 
 115.  Id. at 1-2. 
 116.  Internet Data Brokers: Who Has Access to Your Private Records?: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Energy & Com. H.R., 109th Cong. (2006). 
 117.  Rob Kelley, Charges Against HP’s Dunn Dropped, CNN MONEY (Mar. 14, 2007, 7:51 PM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2007/03/14/technology/hpq/index.htm [https://perma.cc/TG4N-SX76]. 
 118.  Scott Horsley, HP to Pay $14.5 Million to Calif. In ‘Pretexting’ Case, NPR (Dec. 8, 2006, 6:00 
AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6597192 [https://perma.cc/2KYS-T5P6]. 
 119.  Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-476, § 3, 120 Stat. 3568, 
3569. 
 120.  Me. P.L. 2011, ch. 464, § 14. 
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crimes to specify that the state had jurisdiction to prosecute persons who committed 
such crimes when they were physically located outside of the state, so long as the 




By 2011, Maine had updated its existing laws and implemented new laws to 
account for some of the privacy intrusions created or exacerbated by the large-scale 
adoption of computers and the internet.  However, there was much left unaddressed 
by this era of reform.  Social media, big data, machine learning, and other new 
technologies were emerging and expanding rapidly.  These new developments would 
pose privacy threats that Maine’s internet-era reforms were ill-equipped to 
remediate.   
C. Reforms for the Era of Social Media, Big Data, and Machine Learning 
From the early 2010s through present day, we have been living in an era where 
the threats to individual privacies posed by technological advances are complex, 
systemic, and rapidly evolving.  While much has been written about these privacy 
risks, Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism is perhaps the leading 
account of the era.122  Zuboff describes the business models employed by participants 
in what she calls the “surveillance economy.”123  Companies ranging from social 
media platforms, to search engines, to manufacturers of “internet of things” (“IoT”) 
devices provide services and products that collect massive amounts of data about 
their users.124  This data serves as the “raw material[]” for machine-learning 
“prediction products” that are designed to “forecast what we feel, think, and do:  now, 
soon, and later.”125  Surveillance capitalists then sell these prediction products to 
advertisers who use the products to target their advertisements to the users who are 
most likely to purchase their goods or services.126   
The success of this economic model hinges on being able to accurately predict, 
and indeed to positively shape, how users will behave.127  Improving accuracy, in 
turn, requires obtaining more and more data to feed the increasingly complex 
                                                                                                     
 121.  Me. P.L. 2011, ch. 377, § 1.  The state also amended the jurisdictional provisions of the 
computer crimes law to specify that a prosecution could occur in the county where the defendant 
accessed the computer resource or in the country in which the affected computer resource was located.  
Me. P.L. 2011, ch. 133, § 1. 
 122.  See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 94 (2019). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See id. at 93-95 (describing how Google and other surveillance capitalists collect and monetize 
users’ personal information). 
 125.  Id. at 94-96. 
 126.  Id. at 96.  While advertisers are currently the primary customers in the surveillance capitalist 
marketplace, Zuboff explains that there is no reason to expect that the market will remain limited to that 
group.  “The new prediction systems are only incidentally about ads . . . . [A]ny actor with an interest in 
purchasing probabilistic information about our behavior and/or influencing future behavior” is a 
potential customer.  Id. at 96-97. 
 127.  See id. at 95 (explaining that even slight increases in the accuracy of predicting behaviors can 
yield substantial increases in profits); id. at 293 (describing how surveillance capitalists have begun to 
progress from predicting user behavior to modifying user behavior). 
234 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
machine-learning algorithms that inform prediction products.128  Thus, the more data 
about people a product can collect, the more lucrative that product may be for its 
creator.   
The privacy threats arising from an economic model dependent on collecting 
ever-increasing amounts of personal information are significant.  The model results 
in an intrusive “hunt” for personal information, during which no facet of human 
existence is off limits.129  Surveillance capitalists thus aim to collect data about us 
when we browse the internet, watch television, play music, exercise, sleep, drive our 
cars, heat our homes, and when we partake in virtually every other facet of society.  
The decisions driven by companies’ use of this information may be innocuous 
(Which cat photo should we show this person?), life-altering (Should we insure this 
person?), or may pose systemic implications for democracy that we are still coming 
to understand (Which candidate is this person likely to support?).   
Additionally, the large amounts of information made available to surveillance 
capitalists leave consumers vulnerable to the exploits of third parties.  People can be 
hacked, brigaded, doxed, bullied, humiliated, or impersonated on social media, 
creating severe consequences for privacy, identity, and safety in the “real world.”  
New technologies like facial recognition, biometric trackers (such as a FitBit), 
drones, and advances in genetic testing have created thousands of new data points 
that can similarly be used and exploited by companies, governments, and third 
parties.  And the volume and nature of the personal information that surveillance 
capitalists store exacerbates the existing harm caused by data breaches—a problem 
that is certain to further accelerate as we become increasingly dependent on the 
internet for goods and services as a result of the COVID-19 crisis.   
Like many states, Maine is still very much in the process of grasping the scope 
of these privacy challenges and crafting appropriate legislative responses to them.  
Thus far, Maine has enacted targeted reforms designed to combat specific problems 
posed by the technological advances of this era.  The state has acted to protect victims 
of cyberharassment, to guard employees’ social media accounts from employers, to 
protect the privacy of K-12 students from education technology providers, to regulate 
the use of drones by law enforcement, and to establish consumer privacy protections 
that apply to internet service providers (“ISPs”).   
As in the two previous eras discussed above, Maine began this era of reform by 
protecting the residents who are perhaps most vulnerable to online privacy 
intrusions:  victims of harassment.  The ubiquity of smartphones and smartphone 
cameras has led to two particularly disturbing forms of privacy intrusion that are 
most commonly suffered by young women.  The first occurs when a person sends a 
victim an unauthorized and unsolicited sexual image.  The victim in such situations 
usually has no opportunity to avoid seeing the image:  when they open the text 
message, social media message, or email, the image is instantly before them.   
                                                                                                     
 128.  See, e.g., id. at 95 (“Google’s machine intelligence capabilities feed on behavioral surplus, and 
the more surplus they consume, the more accurate the prediction products that result.”). 
 129.  See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (describing how surveillance capitalists once “found” personal 
information by analyzing users’ online behavior, but how personal information is now “hunted 
aggressively and produced largely through surveillance”); id. at 497 (describing surveillance capitalists’ 
goals of obtaining “total information” in order to produce “certainty and the promise of guaranteed 
outcomes” for their prediction products). 
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The legislature decided to address this form of lewd behavior by adding a new 
offense to section 506 of the criminal code: “Harassment by telephone or electronic 
communication device.”130  The new provision makes it a Class D crime to “send[] 
an image or video of a sexual act . . . or of the actor’s or another person’s genitals” 
with “intent to cause affront or alarm or for the purpose of arousing or gratifying 
sexual desire,” to:  (1) a minor under 14 years old; (2) a minor age 14 or 15, if the 
offender is at least 5 years older than the minor; or (3) a person with a mental 
disability that was reasonably apparent to the offender.131  The provision makes it a 
Class E crime to send such an image or video without consent when the person 
receiving the image or video has notified the actor that they do not consent to receive 
the images or videos.132   
The second intrusion occurs when a person posts nude images of another person 
online without their consent.  This is known as “revenge porn,” as it typically occurs 
when a couple breaks up and one of the individuals posts the photos of their ex.133  
Images may be posted on social media, on a general porn site, or on sites specifically 
dedicated to hosting revenge porn.134  The victims are almost always women.135  
Testimony from the Director of Public Policy of the Maine Women’s Lobby before 
the Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety succinctly summarizes the 
problem:   
One of the ways in which our laws have failed to protect victims of abuse is non-
consensual pornography or “revenge porn”.  In some cases, intimate recordings or 
photos may be taken consensually during a positive time in a relationship to be kept 
private between intimate partners.  But, sometimes, these recordings or images may 
be taken non-consensually, either without the victim’s knowledge or under duress, 
as part of a larger pattern of control and abuse.  Later, these images are secretly 
uploaded to a website created for this very purpose. . . .  [T]his horrifying act is 
made even worse when the pictures are accompanied by identifying information, 
potentially including a name, a town, or even a physical address of the victim’s 
home or place of employment.  Some sites seek to profit from the posting of these 
images, demanding thousands of dollars to have the image removed from each 
website to which it was shared.136   
                                                                                                     
 130.  Me. P.L. 2017, ch. 397 § 1. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. (codified at 17-A M.R.S.A. § 506(1)(A-2)). 
 133.  See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 17 (2014) (defining “revenge 
porn” as “the posting of individuals’ nude photographs without their consent”).  For additional materials 
on revenge porn, see generally Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge 
Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014); Zak Franklin, Comment, Justice for Revenge Porn 
Victims: Legal Theories to Overcome Claims of Civil Immunity by Operators of Revenge Porn Websites, 
102 CALIF. L. REV. 1303 (2014); Jenna K. Stokes, Note, The Indecent Internet: Resisting Unwarranted 
Internet Exceptionalism in Combating Revenge Porn, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 929 (2014).  
 134.  See, e.g., CITRON , supra note 133, at 45-46 (telling the story of a revenge porn victim whose 
sexual images and contact information were shared on a site dedicated to revenge porn, on social media, 
and on other websites). 
 135.  Id. at 17 (stating that “most often, revenge porn features women” and citing a study showing 
that 90 percent of revenge porn victims were female). 
 136.  An Act to Prohibit the Unauthorized Dissemination of Certain Images: Hearing on L.D. 679 
Before the Me. J. Comm. on Crim. Justice and Pub. Safety, 127th Legis. 23 (2015) (testimony of Danna 
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The Committee heard more testimony regarding the impact revenge porn had on 
Maine residents when it considered L.D. 679, “An Act to Prohibit the Unauthorized 
Dissemination of Certain Private Images.”137  For example, Representative Grant 
shared a story of a Maine woman whose partner filmed her “without her knowledge 
having relations,” and then “threatened to put [the] images on the Internet unless she 
submitted to his demands.”138  Representative Russell highlighted a similar story 
from the Bangor Daily News which focused on a woman whose abusive ex created 
a fake Facebook page with her identifying information, nude images, and a link to a 
website with images of her performing sexual acts and encouraging people to contact 
her for sex.139  Pine Tree Legal provided testimony showing that forty-four requests 
for protection from abuse orders or harassment in Portland District Court involved 
revenge porn in 2014.140   
L.D. 679 passed through the legislature and went into effect on October 15, 
2015, adding Maine to  the list of approximately twenty-one other states that had 
criminalized revenge porn.141  With some exceptions, the Act made it a crime when 
a person “knowingly disseminates, displays or publishes. . . with intent to harass, 
torment, or threaten,” a photograph, videotape, film or digital recording of another 
person in a state of nudity or engaged in a sexual act . . . when the person knows or 
should have known that the depicted person” is age 18 or older, is identifiable, and 
has not consented.142  The Act also gave victims the ability to obtain an protection 
from abuse order in Maine district court.143   
During the same legislative session in which Maine enacted its revenge porn 
law, the state also established a key privacy protection for employees who use social 
media platforms.  A social media account holds a tremendous amount of personal 
information.  The account holder may make some of this information public, in 
which case it can be viewed by anyone with internet access, including an employer 
or prospective employer.  But other information may be private.  Social media users 
                                                                                                     
Hayes, Director of Public Policy, Maine Women’s Lobby), available from Me. State Law & Leg. 
Reference Library by requesting cf123-LD-0679.pdf. 
 137.  L.D. 679 (127th Legis. 2015) (originally enacted by Me. P. L. 2015, ch. 339, § 1). 
 138.  An Act to Prohibit the Unauthorized Dissemination of Certain Images: Hearing on L.D. 679 
Before the Me. J. Comm. on Crim. Justice and Pub. Safety, 127th Legis. 23 (2015) (testimony of Rep. 
Gay M. Grant). 
 139.  Id. at 11-13 (testimony of Rep. Diane Russell); see also Regina Rooney, The Abuse Follows 
Her Everywhere, and it’s Legal: One Woman’s Story of Revenge Porn, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Apr. 20, 
2015),  https://bangordailynews.com/2015/04/20/mainefocus/the-abuse-followed-her-everywhere-one-
womans-story-of-revenge-porn/ [https://perma.cc/ DC5C-BZPA]. 
 140.  An Act to Prohibit the Unauthorized Dissemination of Certain Images: Hearing on L.D. 679 
Before the Me. J. Comm. on Crim. Justice and Pub. Safety, 127th Legis. 23 (2015) (testimony of Lucia 
Chomeau Hunt). 
 141.  See END REVENGE PORN, Frequently Asked Questions, https://web.archive.org/web/201510 
17065602/http://www.endrevengeporn.org/faqs (archived on Oct. 17, 2015) (listing 21 states that had 
enacted revenge porn laws as of July 2015).  Today, 46 states and the District of Columbia have passed 
criminal laws regarding revenge porn.  46 States + DC + One Territory Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, 
CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/8A5M-
V477] (last visited Apr. 27, 2021). 
 142.  Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 339, § 1. 
 143.  Id.  The legislature would soon amend the Act to ensure that images and identifying 
information filed in revenge porn proceedings were kept under seal and to more fully integrate the Act 
with the state’s abuse—and harassment—prevention laws.  See Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 410. 
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can adjust their privacy settings such that their content can be viewed only by their 
“friends” or “followers” and platforms allow users to privately message each other.   
In response to reports of employers and educational institutions requiring 
employees or students to provide the employer or institution access to their social 
media accounts, state lawmakers around the country began proposing legislation to 
ban that practice.144  By the end of 2012, six states had enacted legislation protecting 
employees or students from these intrusive demands.145  Maine joined this trend in 
2015 by prohibiting employers and prospective employers from requiring an 
employee or applicant to disclose their social media passwords, access their accounts 
in the employer’s presence, provide information about their accounts, disclose 
contacts associated with their accounts, adjust the privacy settings of their accounts, 
discipline employees for failing to comply with such requests, or decline to hire an 
applicant for failing to comply with such requests.146   
Maine also created privacy protections for students during this time by enacting 
the “Student Information Privacy Act” (“SIPA”).147  The SIPA regulates “operators,” 
which are entities that:  (a) operate a website, online service, or application with 
“actual knowledge” that the website, service or application is used for K-12 school 
purposes “and was designed and marketed” for K-12 school purposes; and (b) 
collect, maintain, or use student personal information in a digital or electronic 
format.148  The SIPA subjects operators to several restrictions on how they can use 
and disclose students’ data.  Most notably, operators may not use student data to 
engage in targeted advertising or to amass a profile about a student, sell student data, 
or disclose student data to third parties (with some exceptions for service providers, 
government agencies, and the like).149  Operators must maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices.150  And, operators must delete student data within forty-
five days of receiving a request to delete from a school.151   
While the reforms of this era focused primarily on the privacy abuses attendant 
to new technologies when they are in the hands of private actors, such technologies 
may also be used and abused by governments.  In 2015, Maine enacted a law 
                                                                                                     
 144.  See Samuel A. Thumma, When You Cannot “Just Say No”: Protecting the Online Privacy of 
Employees and Students, 69 S.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (noting the “reported incidents where employers 
and educational institutions have demanded, and received” access to social media accounts); id. at 9-27 
(reviewing different state legislative approaches to regulating employers’ and educational institutions’ 
access to their employees’ or students’ social media accounts). 
 145.  See id. at 9-10 (“Six states enacted [social media access] legislation in 2012, with Maryland and 
Illinois enacting laws in the employment context, Delaware and New Jersey enacting laws in the 
educational context, and California and Michigan enacting laws in both the employment and educational 
contexts.”).  For a complete list of all bills proposed by state lawmakers pertaining to social media 
account access, see Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONF. OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ 
employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx [https://perma.cc/2QHK-UULT] (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2020) (compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures). 
 146.  Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 343, § B-1.  The law does contain a notable exception for investigations into 
misconduct in which the employer “reasonably believes” social media information may be relevant.  Id. 
 147.  Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 256. 
 148.  Id. (codified as amended at 20-A M.R.S.A. § 952(4)). 
 149.  Id. (codified as amended at 20-A M.R.S.A. § 953). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
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designed to curtail government abuses of one new technology that has enjoyed 
widespread adoption during this era:  drones.  Drones are unmanned aerial vehicles 
that may be equipped with surveillance technologies.152  They have numerous uses, 
which may be innocuous (scenic photography),153 highly beneficial (facilitating 
search and rescue operations),154 financially lucrative (automated delivery of 
packages),155 dangerously abusive (stalking),156 or downright dystopian (mass 
surveillance of citizens).157   
In the hands of law enforcement, drones could be used to “engage in constant, 
blanket surveillance of people,” particularly given the “decreasing cost and 
increasing capabilities” of drones over the last several years.158  Maine’s “Act to 
Protect the Privacy of Citizens from Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” guards 
against these potential abuses by creating a regulatory framework for law 
enforcement’s use of drones.159  First, the Act requires prior approval from “the 
                                                                                                     
 152.  See, e.g., Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to 
Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 8 (2014) (describing drones and their advantages 
for use in surveillance); see also DJI, Mavic Air 2 Specifications, https://www.dji.com/mavic-air-2/ 
specs [https://perma.cc/63R3-NU7D] (last visited Nov. 17, 2020) (detailing the capabilities of a mass-
marketed drone, including its camera technology). 
 153.  See Michael L. Smith, Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Drones: The Need for State 
Legislation, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 423 (2015) (noting that private actors “use drones for hobbyist 
purposes”). 
 154.  See Department of Homeland Security, Snapshot: First Responders Assess Drones for Search 
and Rescue Missions, (Apr. 2, 2020) https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/news/2020/04/02/ 
snapshot-first-responders-assess-drones-search-and-rescue-missions [https://perma.cc/7PEN-V95B] 
(describing the various ways in which first responders can use drones and stating that “[s]mall drones 
offer tremendous potential for emergency response missions”). 
 155.  See, e.g., Amazon Unveils Futuristic Plan: Delivery by Drone, CBS NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-unveils-futuristic-plan-delivery-by-drone/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8623-QWTJ] (announcing Amazon’s plans to use drones to deliver merchandise); Jeff Wilke, A Drone 
Program Taking Flight, AMAZON (June 5, 2019), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/transportation/ 
a-drone-program-taking-flight [https://perma.cc/3TED-JW2J] (unveiling an Amazon Prime air drone 
“that can fly up to 15 miles and deliver packages under five pounds to customers in less than 30 
minutes”).  See generally Steve Calandrillo et al., Deadly Drones? Why FAA Regulations Miss the Mark 
on Drone Safety, 23 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 182 (2020) (critiquing the Federal Aviation Administration’s 
approach to regulating drones). 
 156.  See Petition from Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) to the Fed. Aviation Admin. 3 
(Feb. 24, 2012), https://epic.org/apa/lawsuit/EPIC-FAA-Drone-Petition-March-8-2012.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/P86C-HGGP] (raising the possibility that “[c]riminals and other may use drones for purposes 
of stalking and harassment”). 
 157.  See, e.g., Mark Hanrahan, Coronavirus: China Deploys Drones with Cameras, Loudhailers to 
Chastise People for Unsafe Behavior, ABC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/ 
International/coronavirus-china-deploys-drones-cameras-loudhailers-chastise-people/story?id= 
68746989 [https://perma.cc/56YC-3VHT] (describing how China has used drones to enforce social 
distancing rules during the coronavirus pandemic). 
 158.  Smith, supra note 153, at 440-41; see also Farber, supra note 152, at 2 (“State and local police 
departments are eager to equip themselves with drones because they are cheaper and more efficient than 
helicopters and other types of manned aircraft.”). 
 159.  Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 307 (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501).  In the legislative findings section of 
the Act, the legislature noted several potential benefits to drones, but concluded that “the technology 
also presents a potential threat to the privacy of citizens of this State if used by law enforcement in the 
conduct of criminal investigations without appropriate guidelines and supervision.”  Id. (codified at 25 
M.R.S.A. § 4501(1)). 
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governing body of the governmental unit overseeing the law enforcement agency” 
before the agency can acquire a drone.160  Second, the Act limits how drones may be 
used.  Most significantly, law enforcement agencies must obtain a warrant to use a 
drone, unless the drone’s use would be permitted by an exception to the warrant 
requirement under the U.S. Constitution or the Constitution of Maine.161  They are 
prohibited from using weaponized drones and from using drones to surveil peaceful 
protests, but they may use drones for non-investigatory purposes, such as search and 
rescue operations or assessing damage caused by natural disasters.162  Third, the Act 
requires the Trustees of the Maine Criminal Justice Academy to develop minimum 
standards governing the use of drones by law enforcement agencies.  The standards 
must include training requirements; requirements to obtain prior approval from 
higher-ups prior to use; restrictions on the use of intrusive technologies such as high-
powered zoom lenses, video analytics, thermal imaging, and facial recognition; 
procedures to minimize intrusions on third parties who are not the subject of an 
investigation; and more.163  Finally, the Act contains a transparency requirement 
pursuant to which the Commissioner of Public Safety must compile summaries of 
law enforcement agencies’ drone use and warrant requests for deploying drones.164   
Most recently, Maine became the first (and thus far the only) state in the nation 
to regulate ISPs’ use of their customers’ personal information.  Maine passed “An 
Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer Information” shortly after the Trump 
Administration nixed the Federal Communication Commission’s attempt to regulate 
the same.165  The Act requires ISPs to obtain consumers’ consent before using, 
disclosing, or selling their personal information; to take reasonable security measures 
to protect consumers’ personal information; and to provide consumers notice of their 
rights and the ISPs’ obligations under the Act.166   
                                                                                                     
 160.  Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(3)). 
 161.  Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(4)(B)). 
 162.  Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(4)(C)-(F)). 
 163.  Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(5)).  The Act also contains an exception whereby lay 
enforcement agencies can use drones without adopting these standards in emergency situations, with 
approval from the agency’s chief or the Governor.  See id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(4)(G)). 
 164.  Id. (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(6)).  For a comparative evaluation of how other states have 
regulated law enforcement’s use of drones, see Smith, supra note 153, at 427-39 (comparing legislation 
from Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin). 
 165.  Me. P.L. 2019, ch. 216; see also Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other 
Telecommunications Services, 31 FCC Rec. 13911 (2017); David Shepardson, Trump Signs Repeal of 
U.S. Broadband Privacy Rules, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-internet-trump/trump-signs-repeal-of-u-s-broadband-privacy-rules-idUSKBN1752PR [https:// 
perma.cc/5BF7-G4P4]. 
 166.  Me. P.L. 2019, ch. 216.  There is good reason for targeting ISPs for additional regulation when 
it comes to consumer privacy protections.  ISPs have access to information regarding every website a 
user visits and have at times used this access “in privacy-invasive ways, like creating extensive 
portfolios of their users’ online activity and injecting ‘super cookies’ that allow third parties to track 
individual customers.”  Arianna Demas, Maine’s ISP Privacy Law Does Not Violate the First 
Amendment, Much as ISPs Would Like for It To, ACLU (May 29, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/ 
privacy-technology/maines-isp-privacy-law-does-not-violate-the-first-amendment-much-as-isps-would-
like-for-it-to/ [https://perma.cc/BF76-5FYT].  And, as the bill’s sponsor put it, interacting with an ISP is 
“not optional” like visiting a particular website or using a particular software may be; the internet is 
increasingly a necessity.  Steve Mistler, Maine Lawmakers Send One Of The Country's Toughest 
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The state’s early-mover status drew the ire of industry groups, who promptly 
filed suit in federal district court in Bangor.  The complaint in ACA Connects v. Frey 
argues that the Maine law violates the First Amendment guarantee of free speech by, 
inter alia, requiring ISPs to obtain consent before using customers’ personal 
information.167  The complaint also argues that the statute’s “amorphous, broad, and 
open-ended restrictions will . . . [unconstitutionally] chill ISPs’ protected First 
Amendment speech.”168  The case has received national attention, including an 
amicus brief in support of the Act jointly filed by the ACLU, the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, and the Center for Democracy and Technology.169  As of this writing, 
the district court has denied the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings—
rejecting their First Amendment arguments at that stage of the proceedings—and the 
matter is continuing through the discovery stage of litigation.170   
D. Summary of Maine Privacy Law 
Over the last five decades, Maine has developed a body of privacy law designed 
to protect against threats to individual privacy that have evolved and expanded with 
technological advances.  These protections include many foundational privacy laws 
that can be found in most jurisdictions across the country—laws governing 
wiretapping, credit reporting, unauthorized computer access, stalking and 
harassment, private investigators, polygraphs, and data breaches are some examples.  
In more recent years, Maine has risen to the challenge of protecting its residents’ 
privacy by passing modern privacy laws aimed at emerging privacy risks.  Such laws 
include the state’s regulation of ISPs, education technology providers, employers’ 
access to social media accounts, and law enforcement’s use of drones.   
Despite Maine’s recent efforts to respond to the new privacy challenges posed 
by advances in big data, social media, machine learning, and other new technologies, 
there is much work to be done.  Maine’s new privacy laws are largely intended to 
protect specific vulnerable segments of the population, regulate specific actors, or 
guard against intrusions posed by specific new technologies.  This targeted approach 
to privacy reform cannot account for the myriad privacy threats that Maine residents 
face today.  It does not safeguard Mainers’ privacy from the surveillance capitalist 
economic model discussed above and it leaves residents vulnerable to certain new 
technologies that carry potential for serious privacy intrusions.   
To be sure, this critique could be repeated for nearly every state in the nation as 
well as the federal government.  But Maine can and should do better.  In Part III of 
this Article, I propose several reforms that would fill these gaps and make Maine a 
national leader in protecting its residents’ privacy.   
                                                                                                     
Internet Privacy Proposals To The Governor’s Desk, ME. PUB. RADIO (May 3, 2019), https://www. 
mainepublic.org/post/maine-lawmakers-send-one-countrys-toughest-internet-privacy-proposals-
governor-s-desk [https://perma.cc/MTS5-JQG3] (quoting Democratic state Senator Shenna Bellows). 
 167.  See Complaint at 2, ACA Connects v. Frey, No. 1:20-cv-00055 (D. Me. Feb. 14, 2020). 
 168.  Id. at 4.  The complaint also alleges that federal law preempts the Act.  Id. 
 169.  See ACLU et. al as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant, ACA Connects v. Frey, 471 F. Supp. 
3d 318 (D. Me. July 7, 2020). 
 170.  See ACA Connects, 471 F. Supp. 3d at 322, 328.  The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim 
that federal law preempts the Act.  Id. at 326. 
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III. MODERNIZING MAINE PRIVACY LAW 
In Part III of this Article, I propose two categories of privacy reforms.  First, 
Maine should enact a general consumer privacy statute to give residents control over 
how companies collect, use, and share their personal information and to protect 
residents from companies that use their personal information in problematic ways.  
Section II(A) begins by providing overviews of two possible models for a Maine 
consumer privacy law—the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) and the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).  Drawing from 
these privacy regimes, I then advance several recommendations to shape a consumer 
privacy law for Maine.  Second, Maine should supplement the general consumer 
privacy law with new laws aimed at emerging privacy threats that require closer 
regulation.  In Section II(B), I identify five areas in which targeted legislation would 
be desirable:  facial recognition technology; biometric information; smart-home 
devices; data brokers; and the Maine Information and Analysis Center.  I then 
suggest desirable features of potential legislation for each of these issues.   
A. Consumer Privacy Protections 
Enacting a general consumer privacy law that gives consumers rights to their 
personal information and imposes privacy obligations on businesses is perhaps the 
most significant step Maine can take toward protecting its residents’ privacy.  Such 
a law should include the creation of a state agency dedicated to protecting residents’ 
privacy and it should vest that agency with rulemaking authority to address new 
privacy threats as they emerge and evolve.   
There are two existing models on which Maine could pattern a consumer privacy 
law:  the GDPR and the CCPA.  Both governing models vest consumers with 
individual rights to their personal information and impose affirmative obligations on 
businesses to effectuate those rights and safeguard consumer personal information.  
However, the scope of individual rights and business obligations created by the two 
laws differ in important respects and the laws’ enforcement mechanisms vary as well.  
Both privacy regimes are worth examining in fashioning a consumer privacy law for 
Maine.   
1. Potential Templates for a Maine Consumer Privacy Model: The GDPR 
The GDPR is regarded as the world’s most stringent data privacy regime.  The 
2016 law regulates how “controllers” (a person that determines the “purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data”) and “processors” (a person who processes 
personal data on behalf of a controller) collect, use, and share the “personal data” 
(“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person”) of “data 
subjects” (an “identifiable natural person”).171  A complete analysis of the GDPR is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but providing a basic understanding of data 
subjects’ rights, the obligations imposed on controllers and processors, and the law’s 
                                                                                                     
 171.  Commission Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 27, 
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
art. 4, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR] (“Definitions”). 
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enforcement mechanisms is important to framing a Maine consumer privacy law.   
a. Data Subjects’ Individual Rights 
Right of Access:  Data subjects have the right to access their personal data.  The 
right of access allows the data subject to obtain from a controller who is processing 
their personal data the purposes of the processing; the types of personal data being 
processed; the persons to whom personal data may be disclosed; the duration the 
controller will store the subject’s personal information; and more.172  Data subjects 
also have the right to know whether the processing of their personal data includes 
the use of automated decision-making or the use of “profiling,” and to obtain certain 
information about the nature and purpose of such processing.173   
Right to Data Portability:  The right to data portability supplements the right of 
access to ensure that data subjects can receive a copy of their personal data in a 
“structured, commonly used and machine-readable format” that allows the subject to 
transfer the data to another controller (i.e., a competitor) without hinderance.174   
Right to Rectification:  Data subjects have the right to rectify—or correct—
inaccurate or incomplete personal information held by a controller.175   
Right to Erasure:  The right to erasure, also known as the right to be forgotten, 
gives data subjects the right to require controllers to erase their personal data.176  This 
right is not absolute.  There are several exceptions that would allow a controller to 
decline to erase a data subject’s personal data.177   
Right to Restriction of Processing:  There may be situations in which a data 
subject contests the controller’s processing of their personal data but does not want 
the controller to erase the contested data.  In that and similar situations, the GDPR 
gives data subjects the right to instruct a controller to restrict processing their 
personal data.  This right requires the controller to stop processing the subject’s 
personal data, but to continuing storing that data instead of erasing it.178   
Right to Object:  Data subjects have the right to object to the processing of their 
personal information.179  While this right has some exceptions, a controller must 
always honor a data subject’s objection to the use of their personal data for direct 
marketing purposes, creating an effective right to “opt-out” from the use of personal 
data for such purposes.180   
                                                                                                     
 172.  See Id. art. 15 (“Right of access by the data subject”). 
 173.  Id.  “Profiling” means “any form of automated processing . . . consisting of the use of personal 
data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict 
aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal 
preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.”  Id. art. 4 (“Definitions”). 
 174.  Id. art. 20 (“Right to data portability”). 
 175.  Id. art. 16 (“Right to rectification”).  
 176.  Id. art. 17 (“Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”). 
 177.  For example, a controller may decline to erase personal data in some situations where there is 
an “overriding legitimate ground[]” for the processing, where the processing is necessary “for exercising 
the right of freedom and expression and information,” and for “reasons of public interest in the area of 
public health.”  Id. art. 17. 
 178.  Id. art. 18 (“Right to restriction of processing”). 
 179.  Id. art. 21 (“Right to object”). 
 180.  Id. (creating an exception whereby the controller can continue processing personal data if they 
demonstrate “compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and 
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Automated Processing Rights:  Data subjects have the right “not to be subject to 
a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which 
produces legal [or similarly significant] effects concerning him or her.”181  As with 
other GDPR rights, data subjects’ automated processing rights are qualified.  
Controllers and processors may engage in automated decision-making if it is 
necessary to the performance of a contract with the data subject or if they obtain the 
data subject’s “explicit consent.”182  However, even where these exceptions apply, 
the controller must take steps to protect the data subject’s rights and freedoms, 
including the right to obtain “human intervention” in the automated decision-making 
process, and the right for the data subject to contest the automated decision.183  
Moreover, automated decisions may not be based on sensitive characteristics such as 
race, ethnicity, political opinion, religion, and sexual orientation.184   
b. Controllers’ and Processors’ Privacy Obligations 
The obligations the GDPR imposes on controllers and processors are designed 
to effectuate these individual rights.  These obligations are extensive and nuanced; 
only a brief overview is necessary to frame the conversation for proposing a Maine 
consumer privacy law.   
First, controllers must have a legal basis for processing a data subject’s personal 
information.  The GDPR enumerates six legal bases for processing, the most 
commonly invoked of which are processing by consent or processing pursuant to a 
contract with the data subject.185  Because most websites use consent as the legal 
basis for processing personal data obtained through cookies and similar web-tracking 
tools, companies that are subject to the GDPR (and many who are not) have added 
“cookie banners” to their websites, which ask users to consent to the collection of 
personal information before using the website.186   
Second, the GDPR imposes restrictions on how controllers and processors can 
collect and process data.187  Many people have personal data under the control of 
dozens, if not hundreds, of controllers.  Managing how controllers use that data can 
be a full-time job in and of itself.  The GDPR’s collection and processing restrictions 
                                                                                                     
freedoms of the data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims”); id. (“Where 
the data subject objects to processing for direct marketing purposes, the personal data shall no longer be 
processed for such purposes.”). 
 181.  Id. art. 22. 
 182.  Id.  The right also does not apply if the decision-making is “authorised by Union or Member 
State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the 
data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests.”  Id. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id.  There are narrow exceptions that allow automated decision-making on these bases in some 
situations where the controller has obtained consent or there is a substantial public interest for the 
processing.  See id. (referencing the sensitive characteristics and the exceptions contained in GDPR art. 
9, “Processing of special categories of personal data”). 
 185.  See id. art. 6. 
 186.  See generally Martin Degeling et al., We Value Your Privacy … Now Take Some Cookies: 
Measuring the GDPR’s Impact on Web Privacy, NETWORK & DISTRIBUTED SYS. SEC. (NDSS) SYMP. 
2019 (conducting an examination of 6,579 of the most popular websites in the EU’s 28 member states 
and concluding that by February 2019 62.1% of the websites had added cookie banners). 
 187.  See GDPR, supra note 171, art. 5 (“Principles relating to processing of personal data”). 
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are designed to shift some of the burden onto controllers for ensuring that personal 
data is used in accordance with the data subject’s expectations.  The restrictions 
include obligations to minimize the amount of personal data a controller or processor 
uses (“data minimization”), to collect personal data only for specified purposes and 
to use the data only for those purposes (“purpose limitation”), and to store personal 
data in an identifiable format for no longer than is necessary for the specified 
purpose(s) of the processing (“storage limitation”).188  Controllers must 
operationalize these restrictions by implementing “appropriate technical and 
organizational measures.”189   
Third, controllers have several notification obligations designed to facilitate data 
subjects’ exercise of their rights.190  This includes disclosing to the data subject, at 
the time when personal data is collected, the identity of the controller, the purposes 
of the processing and the legal basis of the processing, third parties with whom the 
data may be shared, details about data subjects’ rights, any use of automated 
decision-making, and more.191  Additionally, upon receipt of a request to delete or to 
rectify, controllers must notify third parties with whom they have shared the data 
subject’s personal data, such that the data subject does not need to separately submit 
a request to each person with whom the controller shares their personal data.192   
Fourth, the GDPR imposes heightened requirements for processing certain 
sensitive types of personal data.  This includes processing children’s personal data193; 
processing personal data pertaining to criminal convictions and offenses;194 
processing personal data revealing sensitive demographic information such as race, 
religion, political opinion, or sexual orientation;195 and processing genetic data or 
biometric data.196   
c. Enforcement 
The final aspect of the GDPR that is important to understand in considering a 
framework for a Maine consumer privacy law is the GDPR’s approach to 
enforcement.  The GDPR requires EU member states to vest regulatory authority 
                                                                                                     
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. art. 25 (“Data protection by design and by default”). 
 190.  See id. art. 12 (“Transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the 
rights of the data subject”). 
 191.  See id. art. 13 (“Information to be provided where personal data are collected from the data 
subject”); Id. art. 14 (“Information to be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the 
data subject”). 
 192.  See id. art. 19 (“Notification obligation regarding rectification or erasure of personal data or 
restriction of processing”). 
 193.  See id. art. 8 (“Conditions applicable to child's consent in relation to information society 
services”) (requiring parental consent for processing personal information of children under age 16). 
 194.  Id. art. 10 (“Processing of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences”) 
(allowing processing of such information only under government control or supervision, unless 
otherwise authorized by a Union or Member-State law that contains appropriate safeguards for the rights 
and freedoms of data subjects). 
 195.  Id. art. 9 (“Processing of special categories of personal data”) (prohibiting the processing of 
such data and listing exceptions to the prohibition). 
 196.  See id. (listing biometric information and genetic information among the list of special 
categories of personal data). 
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over the GDPR in an independent agency, called a “supervisory authority.”197  These 
agencies have numerous responsibilities and powers relating to the implementation 
and interpretation of the GDPR, enforcement, investigations, and more.198  The 
agencies are required to receive and process complaints filed by data subjects against 
controllers or processors and have authority to impose administrative fines in 
substantial amounts.199  Depending on the circumstances, a supervisory authority 
may impose fines of up to €20,000,000 or 4% of a company’s annual global 
revenues.200   
The GDPR also includes a private right of action for data subjects who believe 
their GDPR rights have been violated.  Data subjects have the right to an “effective 
judicial remedy” against a controller or processor that the data subject believes 
infringed their GDPR rights.201  This right includes the ability to obtain compensation 
for damages from the controller or processor.202  Data subjects also have the right to 
an effective judicial remedy against supervisory authorities that make a decision 
adverse to the data subject or fail to process the data subject’s complaint.203   
2. Potential Templates for a Maine Consumer Privacy Model: The CCPA 
In 2018, California became the first state in the U.S. to enact a comprehensive 
consumer privacy law.204  The state adopted the CCPA as an eleventh-hour 
compromise with Californians for Consumer Privacy, a nonprofit group that had 
developed a consumer privacy ballot initiative that Californians were expected to 
pass in the 2018 election cycle.205  The group agreed to pull the initiative in exchange 
for the legislature enacting the CCPA.206   
The CCPA regulates “businesses,” a term defined to encompass companies that:  
(a) do business in California; and (b) have annual revenues exceeding $25 million, 
collect personal information from more than 50,000 California residents; or (c) 
derive 50% or more of their revenues from selling California residents’ personal 
                                                                                                     
 197.  Id. art. 51 (“Supervisory authority”). 
 198.  Id. arts. 57-58 (“Tasks” and “Powers,” respectively).  
 199.  Id. arts. 77, 83 (“Right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority” and “General 
conditions for imposing administrative fines,” respectively). 
 200.  Id. art. 83(5). 
 201.  Id. art. 79 (“Right to an effective judicial remedy against a controller or processor”). 
 202.  Id. art. 82 (“Right to compensation and liability”). 
 203.  Id. art. 78 (“Right to an effective judicial remedy against a supervisory authority”). 
 204.  As I discuss later in this Section, in the 2020 election cycle California voters approved a ballot 
initiative called the California Privacy Rights Act (“CPRA”).  That law significantly expands upon the 
CCPA’s privacy protections such that California’s privacy regime will look much like the GDPR when 
the core components of the CPRA go into effect in 2023.  However, in this Section, I focus on the 
CCPA as originally enacted to provide Maine legislators and reformers with a contrast between two 
types of privacy regimes:  the GDPR and the (original) CCPA. 
 205.  See Stuart L. Pardau, The California Consumer Privacy Act: Towards a European-Style 
Privacy Regime in the United States?, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 68, 89-91 (2018) (describing the 
circumstances surrounding Californians for Consumer Privacy’s ballot initiative and the legislature’s 
adoption of the CCPA); The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2017 Cal. A.B. 375 (West 
2017), (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100-198 (West 2018)); Yes on 24, 
CALIFORNIANS FOR CONSUMER PRIV., http://www.caprivacy.org [https://perma.cc/YE85-4HTJ] (last 
visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 206.  Pardau, supra note 205, at 90-91. 
246 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:2 
information.207  The Act gives California residents—called “consumers”—certain 
rights to their “personal information,” which is defined broadly to encompass any 
information reasonably capable of being associated with a consumer.208   
The CCPA is sometimes called “California’s GDPR,” but the laws contain many 
important differences.209  The rights created by the CCPA are more limited than those 
created by the GDPR, and the obligations imposed on covered businesses are 
concomitantly more limited as well.  The CCPA also did not create a dedicated 
consumer privacy agency to implement and enforce the law.  And, the private right 
of action provided by the CCPA is far more limited than the GDPR’s.   
Consumers have three main rights under the CCPA:  the right to know, the right 
to delete, and the right to opt-out.  The right to know is a transparency measure.  It 
gives consumers the right to obtain from a business information about the personal 
information it has collected about the consumer.210  This information includes the 
types of sources from which the business collects personal information, the purposes 
for which the company collects and sells personal information, the types of persons 
with whom the business shares personal information, and the categories and specific 
pieces of personal information collected.211  The right to delete allows consumers to 
instruct businesses to delete their personal information, but the right contains many 
exceptions that allow businesses to decline a request to delete.212  Lastly, the right to 
opt-out allows consumers to opt-out from the sale of their personal information.213   
                                                                                                     
 207.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (West 2018) (defining “Business”).  “Businesses” under the 
CCPA are comparable to “controllers” under the GDPR. See GDPR, supra note 171, art 4.  The CCPA 
also regulates service providers, which are comparable to “processors” under the GDPR.  See § 
1798.140(v) (defining “Service provider”); see also GDPR, supra note 171, art. 4. 
 208.  See § 1798.140(g) (defining “consumer”); id. § 1798.140(o) (defining “personal information” 
as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or 
could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household,” and listing 
several categories of information that may be personal information under the Act). 
 209.  See, GDPR & CCPA: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact of Competition and 
Innovation: Hearing Before the U.S. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 12 (2019) [hereinafter 
Richardson Testimony] (testimony of Michelle Richardson of the Center for Democracy & Technology) 
(“While the CCPA is often referred to as a ‘Californian GDPR,’ this is inaccurate.”); Luke Irwin, 
California's 'GDPR-Like' Privacy Law Passes: What You Need to Know, IT GOVERNANCE USA BLOG 
(July 16, 2018), https://www.itgovernanceusa.com/blog/californias-gdpr-like-privacy-law-passes-what-
you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/66CM-L6F8] (referring to the CCPA as being similar to the 
GDPR); Richi Jennings, CCPA, California's GDPR, Confuses and Confounds, TECHBEACON, 
https://techbeacon.com/security/ccpa-californias-gdpr-confuses-confounds [https://perma.cc/P8YG-
YZZE] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (same); Andy Patrizio, While No One Was Looking, California 
Passed its Own GDPR, NETWORK WORLD (July 5, 2018), https://www.networkworld.com/article/ 
3286611/while-no-one-was-looking-california-passed-its-own-gdpr.html [https://perma.cc/6BBW-
ZRXY] (same). 
 210.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110 (West 2020) (giving consumers the right to request 
information about their personal information from a business and obligating businesses to disclose such 
information). 
 211.  See id. § 1798.110(a) (listing the types of information a consumer may request from a 
business). 
 212.  See id. § 1798.105 (creating the right to delete and stating that a business need not comply with 
a request to delete in several circumstances, such as when the personal information is necessary to 
complete a transaction, detect a security incident, exercise free speech, comply with a legal obligation, 
or when the personal information is used for certain internal purposes). 
 213.  See id. § 1798.120 (establishing the right to opt-out). 
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The obligations imposed on businesses mirror these rights.  Businesses must 
provide a notice, at or before the point of collecting personal information, that 
discloses what personal information the business collects, the purposes for which the 
business uses the information, a link allowing consumers to opt-out from the sale of 
their personal information, and a link to the business’s privacy policy.214  A 
business’s privacy policy must in turn contain an explanation of how consumers can 
submit requests to exercise their CCPA rights.215  Businesses must also establish 
processes to receive and process consumers’ requests to exercise their rights, 
including maintaining a “Do Not Sell My Information” link on their websites that 
allows consumers to opt-out of the sale of their personal information.216   
These rights and obligations are narrower than those imposed by the GDPR.  
The right to know, delete, and opt-out parallel the GDPR’s rights of access, erasure, 
and objection to direct marketing, but the CCPA does not contain a right to 
rectification, rights regarding automated decision-making or profiling, or rights 
regarding sensitive personal information (except children’s information217).  The 
CCPA also does not require businesses to establish a legal basis, such as consent, for 
processing personal information; businesses only need to provide notice—not obtain 
consent—before collecting information.  Given the lack of a consent requirement, 
there is no right to object to processing under the CCPA.218  Finally, the CCPA does 
not contain parallels to the GDPR’s data minimization requirement or its data storage 
limitations.  These omissions have led privacy advocates to criticize the law for 
placing too heavy a burden on consumers in policing how businesses use their 
personal information.219   
The CCPA and the GDPR differ significantly when it comes to enforcement, as 
well.  Unlike the GDPR, the CCPA did not create an independent agency for 
implementing and enforcing the law.  The law instead vested that authority in the 
California Attorney General,220 who may impose civil penalties up to $2,500 per 
                                                                                                     
 214.  See id. § 1798.100 (establishing the notice requirement); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.305(b) 
(2020) (listing the notice’s required content). 
 215.  See  CAL. CIV. CODE. § 1798.130(a)(5) (listing content that is required to be included in a 
business’s privacy policy, including a “description of a consumer’s rights pursuant to [the CCPA] and 
two or more designated methods for submitting requests”). 
 216.  See id § 1798.130(a)(1)-(2) (requiring businesses to establish processes for consumers to 
submit requests for information and requiring businesses to respond to such requests within specified 
time limits); id. § 1798.135 (requiring businesses to maintain a “Do Not Sell My Personal Information” 
link that brings consumers to a web page where they can opt-out from the sale of their personal 
information). 
 217.  The CCPA prohibits businesses from knowingly selling the personal information of children 
under 16 years-old unless the business obtains consent from:  (a) the child’s parent if the child is less 
than 13; or (b) the child if the child is 13, 14, or 15 years-old.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(c) (West 
2020). 
 218.  As noted directly above, the CCPA’s right to opt-out does parallel the GDPR’s right to object, 
but only to the extent the GDPR right applies to direct marketing of personal data. 
 219.  See, e.g., Richardson Testimony, supra note 209, at 12-13 (criticizing the CCPA as being 
“largely focused on transparency” rather than on limiting data collection and use).  Indeed, Richardson 
is critical of both regulatory regimes for the burdens they place on consumers.  Id. at 13-15.  Relying on 
a notice or consent requirement “burdens individuals with navigating every notice, data policy, and 
setting, trying to make informed choices that align with their personal privacy interests.”  Id. at 14. 
 220.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(a) (West 2020) (requiring the Attorney General to adopt 
regulations). 
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unintentional violation and $7,500 per intentional violation.221  And, the CCPA 
provides only a limited private right of action to consumers.  Consumers may only 
bring suit under the CCPA when a business’s lax security practices lead to a data 
breach that causes the consumer harm.222  The law establishes a statutory damages 
range of $100 - $750 per consumer, per incident, or actual damages, whichever is 
greater.223  The CCPA does not give consumers a private right of action when a 
business violates the right to know, right to delete, or right to opt-out.   
Many of the material differences between the CCPA and the GDPR may be short 
lived.  In November 2020, Californians approved Prop. 24, the California Privacy 
Rights Act (“CPRA”), which amended the CCPA to bring consumers’ rights and 
businesses’ obligations in line with the GDPR’s treatment of data subjects and 
controllers.224  The CPRA also created a dedicated state agency to protect consumer 
privacy, the California Privacy Protection Agency.225  While the provisions of the 
CPRA creating the new agency went into effect immediately, the new consumer 
rights are not effective until January 1, 2023.226   
3. Maine Consumer Privacy Legislation 
Maine’s legislature has already recognized the importance of the privacy 
interests protected by the GDPR and the CCPA and has granted some of the rights 
provided by those laws.  However, Maine has done so only for limited classes of 
people and in limited circumstances.  The “Student Information Privacy Act” 
(“SIPA”), discussed above, provides a prime example.  By enacting the SIPA, the 
legislature acknowledged the privacy risks created when companies use personal 
data for marketing purposes and accordingly prevented covered businesses from 
using students’ data for such purposes.227  Like the GDPR, the SIPA contains 
protections against profiling; a recognition that amassing personal data to gain 
insights into a person’s preferences and behaviors can create a significant violation 
of privacy.228  The SIPA prohibits the sale of student data and limits when such data 
can be disclosed to third parties, protecting similar privacy interests as the GDPR’s 
                                                                                                     
 221.  Id. § 1798.155(b). 
 222.  Id. § 1798.150(a)(1) (authorizing a civil action for certain security breaches). 
 223.  Id. § 1798.150(A) (creating the damages limitation). 
 224.  See Cal. Sec’y of State, Proposition 24 Amends Consumer Privacy Laws,  https:// 
electionresults.sos.ca.gov/returns/maps/ballot-measures/prop/24 [https://perma.cc/G7ZD-GBEF] (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2021) (showing that Proposition 24 passed by a 56.2% – 43.8% margin); California 
Proposition 24, Consumer Personal Information Law and Agency Initiative (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_24,_Consumer_Personal_Information_Law_and_Agency
_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/HWR3-J7WC] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (showing that 
Proposition 24 passed by a 56.2% to 43.8% margin); Cal. Sec’y of State, Proposition 24, §§ 5-11, 
https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/general/pdf/topl-prop24.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV68-NZT2] (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2021) (establishing consumer rights). 
 225.  Cal. Sec’y of State, Proposition 24, § 24, https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/general/pdf/topl-
prop24.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV68-NZT2] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (establishing the California 
Privacy Protection Agency). 
 226.  Id. § 31 (establishing the effective dates for various provisions of the CPRA). 
 227.  See 20-A M.R.S.A. §§ 951-53 (Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.). 
 228.  Id. § 953(1)(B). 
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right to object and the CCPA’s right to opt-out.229  Finally, the SIPA requires covered 
businesses to implement reasonable security controls and requires businesses to 
delete students’ data upon request.230  The GDPR and the CCPA both impose similar 
obligations.231   
Maine’s groundbreaking legislation protecting the privacy of ISP customers 
likewise guards many of the same privacy interests as the GDPR and the CCPA.  In 
enacting the ISP legislation, the legislature took the position that threats to privacy 
come not only from the exploitation of personal information like names, dates of 
birth, credit cards, and social security numbers, but also from technical information 
like device identifiers, application usage history, and IP addresses that can be used 
to track an individual’s online behavior.232  The legislation’s broad definition of 
“customer personal information” encompasses these identifiers just as do the 
CCPA’s and the GDPR’s respective definitions of “personal information” and 
“personal data.”233  The legislation also contains notice and consent requirements 
and imposes cybersecurity obligations, all of which are similar to obligations found 
in either the GDPR or the CCPA.234   
These laws, in sum, constitute a legislative recognition that certain classes of 
Mainers—K-12 students and ISP customers—have a privacy interest in controlling 
how their personal information is collected, used, shared, and sold.  It is time for the 
legislature to recognize that all Maine residents hold these privacy interests and that 
a wide variety of businesses put these interests at risk.  Maine should enact a general 
consumer privacy law.   
The details of a Maine consumer privacy law would necessarily be the product 
of much legislative debate, input from privacy advocates and industry, and 
compromise.  Here, I limit my recommendations to structural features of the law that 
I deem particularly desirable or important for the state.  Lawmakers and reformers 
should view these recommendations as a starting point for the conversation around 
enacting a Maine consumer privacy law.  I leave choices such as what specific rights 
to give consumers, whether to require businesses to establish a lawful basis before 
collecting personal information, and whether the law should apply to all persons that 
collect personal information (like the GDPR) or to a subset of businesses based on 
revenue or data-collection thresholds (like the CCPA) up to the legislative process.   
Rulemaking Authority:  A Maine consumer privacy law should give a state 
agency the power to promulgate regulations interpreting the law.  Maine’s recent 
                                                                                                     
 229.  Id. § 953(1)(C)-(D); see also id. § 953(3) (listing exceptions to SIPA’s disclosure restrictions). 
 230.  Id. § 953(2)(B). 
 231.  See GDPR, supra note 171, art. 17 (“Right to Erasure (‘Right to be Forgotten’)”); id. art. 32 
(“Security of Processing”) (requiring processors and controllers to implement “appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk” posed by a breach of the 
personal data processed by the person); CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (West 2020) (establishing the right 
to delete); CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.150 (West 2020) (incentivizing strong security practices by creating a 
private right of action when a consumer’s “nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information” is 
breached as a result of the business’s “violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable 
security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the information”). 
 232.  35-A M.R.S.A. § 9301(1)(C) (Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.). 
 233.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2021 Reg. Sess.) 
(defining “personal information”); GDPR, supra note 171, art. 4(1) (defining “personal data”). 
 234.  35-A M.R.S.A. § 9301(3), (6) (Westlaw through 2019 2d Reg. Sess.). 
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history of privacy reform illustrates why vesting such authority in a state agency is 
necessary.  The history shows a legislature grappling with a near-impossible task:  
keeping up with advances in technology that move faster than a deliberative body 
can reasonably be expected to move.235  Giving a state agency authority to clarify 
ambiguities in the law, to provide guidance on implementing the law, and to 
promulgate regulations applying the law to new technologies would go a long way 
toward mitigating the challenges inherent to legislating privacy protections.236   
The most desirable option for allocating regulatory authority over consumer 
privacy would be to create a new agency dedicated to the task, much like EU 
member-states and California now have.  A dedicated consumer privacy agency 
would be more capable of developing expertise in the area, working with industry, 
and enforcing the law than would an agency with numerous competing 
responsibilities.  If, however, establishing a new state agency is politically untenable, 
then the legislature could grant regulatory and enforcement authority to the Office of 
the Maine Attorney General, given its relevant experience with enforcement and 
rulemaking for Maine’s consumer protection laws and the state’s data breach law.237   
Private Right of Action:  The law should include a private right of action rather 
than rely solely on agency actions for enforcement.  A private right of action would 
allow consumers to vindicate their own privacy rights rather than be dependent on 
an agency to act.  Further, enforcement actions can be expensive and time-
consuming, particularly when an action is brought against a large tech company that 
can afford an army of lawyers.  In a state with limited resources, like Maine, a private 
right of action can save costs by shifting some of the enforcement burden to private 
sector attorneys and advocacy groups.   
A private right of action would likely draw pushback from industry and industry 
allies in the legislature.238  New privacy laws can be difficult for companies to 
                                                                                                     
 235.  Cf. Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 65 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1041, 1085 (2013) (“[O]ne consistent failing in privacy legislation has been that legislation is 
drafted in technology-specific terms or technology-specific application; given the pace of advancements 
in technology, this has resulted in outdated and inapplicable portions of law.”); Michael T. Rustad & 
Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global Data Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 374-75 (2019) 
(describing the “legal lag” that occurs “when laws fall behind disruptive societal developments, such as 
rapid technological change”). 
 236.  Cf. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., FEDERAL BASELINE PRIVACY LEGISLATION DISCUSSION 
DRAFT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-12-12-CDT-Privacy-
Discussion-Draft-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3NH-CWA3] (proposing federal privacy legislation that 
gives the Federal Trade Commission rulemaking authority). 
 237.  See 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 (2020) (giving the Attorney General authority to make rules and 
regulations interpreting the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act’s prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices); 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1349, 1350-A (2020) (dividing enforcement and rulemaking authority 
over Maine’s data breach law between the Department of Professional and Financial Regulation and the 
Attorney General). 
 238.  The inclusion of a private right of action has been a major sticking point in the State of 
Washington’s proposed Privacy Act.  “Privacy advocates argue that a private right of action is essential 
for consumers to adequately enforce their privacy rights.  Conversely, business advocates argue that a 
private right of action (particularly, one that allows for attorney’s fees) would result in endless 
litigation.”  Megan Herr, Malia Rogers, & David M. Stauss, Washington Privacy Act Update: Private 
Right of Action Added in House, SECURITY MAGAZINE (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.securitymagazine. 
com/articles/91834-washington-privacy-act-update-private-right-of-action-added-in-house [https:// 
perma.cc/3WW7-ZQZZ]. 
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implement, and not every technical violation of a consumer privacy law should 
necessarily result in civil liability.  The legislature can strike the appropriate balance 
between its compliance goals and these industry concerns by qualifying the private 
right of action.  I suggest three limitations.   
First, the law could include a one-year grace period to give companies time to 
implement and operationalize the law without fear of incurring civil liabilities.239  
Second, the law could impose a scienter requirement for actions based on a 
company’s violation of the law’s individual privacy rights.  Such actions could be 
cognizable only when the company acted with gross negligence, recklessness, or 
intentional misconduct.  This scienter requirement would prevent litigants from 
seeking damages for violations caused by ordinary mistakes made during the process 
of disclosing information, removing someone from a marketing list, deleting 
someone’s information, and the like.  In contrast, private actions for data breaches 
could carry a negligence standard—similar to the CCPA’s standard—to incentivize 
best security practices and to protect consumers from the risks of identity theft and 
exposure of sensitive personal information.240  Third, the law could specify a 
damages range similar to the CCPA’s range of $100 - $750, or actual damages, 
whichever is greater.241  Harms posed by privacy violations are difficult to 
quantify.242  Creating a statutory range will reduce uncertainty and make it easier for 
individual plaintiffs to vindicate their privacy rights.243   
Automated Decision-Making:  Creating basic rules for products and services that 
incorporate automated decision-making technologies is particularly important for 
Maine at this time.  In early 2020, Northeastern University announced the opening 
of the Roux Institute in Portland. 244  The Institute provides graduate-level programs 
in several disciplines that revolve around automated decision-making 
technologies.245  Indeed, the impetus for Lewiston native David Roux’s $100 million 
donation to open the Institute was to grow the state’s technology sector by 
                                                                                                     
 239.  The CCPA contained a similar provision, delaying enforcement of the Act for six months after 
its effective date.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.185(c) (West 2018) (“The Attorney General shall not 
bring an enforcement action under this title until six months after the publication of the final regulations 
issued pursuant to this section or July 1, 2020, whichever is sooner.”). 
 240.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.) 
(authorizing a civil action for certain data breaches caused by a “business’s violation of the duty to 
implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”). 
 241.  Id. § 1798.150(a)(1)(A). 
 242.  See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 486 (2010) 
(noting that “American tort law in particular tends to focus on identifying and compensating harms that 
can be economically quantified,” and that “[i]t is difficult to quantify many privacy harms in this way.”); 
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer 
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 118 (2003) (commenting that “the value of the data profile of any 
particular individual is small and difficult to quantify,” and that “requiring victims of consumer profiling 
to prove a specific monetary loss [thus] unwarrantedly prejudices their claims.”). 
 243.  See McClurg, supra note 242. 
 244.  Willis Ryder Arnold, Northeastern University Launches $100 Million High-Tech Graduate 
Institute in Portland, ME. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.mainepublic.org/post/northeastern-
university-launches-100-million-high-tech-graduate-institute-portland [https://perma.cc/73SD-D4Y2]. 
 245.  See Take Your Academics in a Brave New Direction, THE ROUX INSTIT. AT NE UNIV., https:// 
roux.northeastern.edu/academics [https://perma.cc/YWW3-U8TU] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (listing 
Experiential AI, Computer and Data Sciences, Digital Engineering, and Bioinformatics among the 
Institute’s field of studies). 
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“work[ing] with Maine-based companies and provid[ing] certificates, master’s 
degrees, and Ph.D.s in artificial intelligence and machine learning.”246   
The Roux Institute promises to be a boon for the state’s economy, but the 
industry it will foster would benefit from some safeguards to protect residents from 
externalities associated with automated decision-making technologies.  Left 
unchecked, such technologies can inadvertently (or intentionally) be used to 
exacerbate existing social inequities and to create new ones.247   
In her book, Weapons of Math Destruction, Cathy O’Neil identifies a harmful 
subset of automated decision-making technologies that she calls “WMDs.”  As she 
explains, WMDs “encode[] human prejudice, misunderstanding, and bias” and tend 
to “punish the poor and oppressed in our society, while making the rich richer.”248  
These dangerous automated decision-making technologies tend to share three 
common characteristics.   
First, WMDs are opaque.  Subjects may be unaware that automated decision-
making technology is being used to make a decision about them.249  And, even if 
they are aware of the technology, they are usually unaware of what inputs the 
algorithm uses to make decisions about them and how those inputs are weighed.250  
The lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess whether a decision-making 
technology produces unfair results, limits a subject’s ability to challenge the results, 
and can “lead to a feeling of unfairness” even if the technology is otherwise fair.251   
Second, WMDs are damaging:  they work against the subject’s interest, produce 
unfair results, and damage or destroy lives.252  This damage is usually caused by a 
“feedback loop” in the WMD, which occurs when a decision-making technology 
lacks feedback to inform whether the decisions it makes are correct.253  Without 
feedback, WMDs cannot “learn[] from [their] mistakes” and instead create their own 
truths—a teacher is bad because the technology says he is bad, a criminal is 
dangerous because the technology says she is dangerous, a job applicant is unreliable 
because the technology says he is unreliable—and none of these decisions are 
evaluated for accuracy so the technology can be adjusted and improved.254   
                                                                                                     
 246.  Arnold, supra note 244. 
 247.  See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES 
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (identifying a harmful subset of automated decision-
making technologies that O’Neil calls “WMDs”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR 
INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? 8-10 (Jan. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-
data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA3E-
B78B] (listing the ways in which “potential inaccuracies and biases” with big data “might lead to 
detrimental effects for low-income and underserved populations”); RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER 
TECHNOLOGY (2019) (detailing how the use of big data in automated decision-making technologies 
perpetuates systemic racial biases and inequities). 
 248.  O’NEIL, supra note 247, at 3. 
 249.  See id. at 28-29 (describing WMDs as being opaque or invisible). 
 250.  See id. at 28 (“We’re modeled as shoppers and couch potatoes, as patients and loan applicants, 
and very little of this do we see . . . .”). 
 251.  Id. at 10, 28-29 (“But you cannot appeal to a WMD.  That’s part of their fearsome power.  They 
do not listen.  Nor do they bend. . . . [T]he programs deliver unflinching verdicts, and the human beings 
employing them can only shrug, as if to say ‘Hey, what can you do?’”). 
 252.  See id. at 29. 
 253.  See id. at 6-7. 
 254.  Id. 
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Third, WMDs are scalable.255  When a WMD has the capacity to “grow 
exponentially” a “local nuisance[]” can become a “tsunami force[]” that produces 
unfair results across whole sectors of the economy and society.256   
Examples of WMDs, as O’Neil details, are legion.  WMDs rank universities,257 
determine what advertisements we see (often to the detriment of the poor and 
oppressed),258 identify which neighborhoods to (over)police,259 and make a range of 
financially consequential decisions regarding employment, access to credit, and 
insurance.260   
How do we curb the reach of existing WMDs and prevent the promising big-
data industry in Maine from becoming a laboratory for new ones?  Fortunately, there 
is a menu of options from which the legislature can choose.  O’Neil’s 
recommendations include requiring that automated decision-making technologies be 
regularly audited for accuracy and fairness; imposing transparency measures to allow 
consumers to better understand how the technologies make decisions; and expanding 
existing laws that regulate credit reporting agencies, heath care data, and 
discrimination to encompass more products that rely on automated decision-making 
technologies.261   
The GDPR creates a default rule that decisions “based solely on automated 
processing” that produce “legal effects” or “similarly significant[]” effects are 
prohibited.262  Companies can avoid this rule only when automated processing is 
necessary for the performance of a contract, authorized by law, or based on the 
subject’s consent.  Even in such situations, national law and the controller must 
provide “suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests.”263  At a minimum, controllers must provide the data subject the 
right to obtain human intervention in the decision-making and to contest the 
decision.264   
Finally, the newly-enacted CPRA requires the California Privacy Protection 
Agency to address automated decision-making technologies via regulation.  The 
Agency must promulgate regulations “governing access and opt-out rights with 
respect to businesses’ use of automated decision-making technology” including the 
right to receive “meaningful information about the logic involved in those 
decisionmaking processes, as well as a description of the likely outcome of the 
process with respect to the consumer.”265   
                                                                                                     
 255.  Id. at 29-30. 
 256.  Id. at 30. 
 257.  See id. at Ch. 3 (arguing that the U.S. News’s model for ranking colleges and universities is a 
WMD). 
 258.  See id. at Ch. 4 (explaining how for-profit colleges target misleading advertisements to poor 
Americans). 
 259.  See id. at Ch. 5 (detailing how the use of crime-prediction programs creates a feedback loop 
whereby increased arrests in impoverished neighborhoods leads to over-policing in those 
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 260.  See id. at Chs. 6-7 (employment), Ch. 8 (credit), Ch. 9 (insurance). 
 261.  Id. at 208-14. 
 262.  GDPR, supra note 171, art. 22. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  California Privacy Rights Act, California Proposition 24 § 21 (2020). 
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I recommend taking elements from each of these (somewhat overlapping) 
approaches to regulating automated decision-making technologies.  Specifically, 
Maine should require companies to regularly audit technologies that make automated 
decisions about important aspects of life; empower consumers to obtain human 
intervention and to contest automated decisions; and endow a regulatory agency with 
rulemaking authority to adjust the rules for this rapidly evolving technology.  
Additional protections for automated decisions based on sensitive personal 
characteristics like race, religion, and gender, and based on proxies for such 
characteristics, would also be desirable.   
Targeted Advertising:  The digital advertising industry is a complex information 
ecosystem.  Content publishers—such as websites, social media platforms, search 
engines, and video platforms—collect vast amounts of personal information from 
users and then use that information to allow advertisers to target their ads to highly 
specific segments of the platform’s user-base.266  Users’ personal information is also 
made available to specialized service providers that assist content publishers and 
advertisers in facilitating ad placements or optimizing ad campaigns.267  The 
collection, use, and exchange of personal information adds up to a highly lucrative 
and highly effective digital advertising industry.268  The ability to target digital ads 
based on user personal information is the backbone of the industry.269   
A lack of clarity in the CCPA regarding whether targeted advertising involves 
the “sale” of personal information, as that term is defined by the CCPA, has caused 
needless uncertainty and confusion in the implementation of that law.270  For 
example, two of the world’s largest tech companies, Google and Facebook, have 
taken opposite positions on whether targeted advertising involves a sale of personal 
information under the CCPA and whether consumers thus have a right to opt-out 
from targeted advertising.271  The Interactive Advertising Bureau (“IAB”), a digital 
advertising industry group, has created a complex CCPA framework in an attempt to 
avoid violating the law if California’s Attorney General does interpret the term “sale” 
to apply to targeted advertising.272  But this attempt to avoid “selling” personal 
                                                                                                     
 266.  Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 137 (2019) 
(“[T]argeting requires advertisers to collect as much data as possible about the user—not only 
demographic data, but minute-by-minute data about the user’s location, mood, and desires.”). 
 267.  See generally Dina Srinivasan, Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets Competition 
Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation, 24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 55, 70-
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 268.  Russell A. Miller, The Legal Fate of Internet Ad-Blocking, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 299, 306-
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 271.  Patience Haggin, Facebook Won’t Change Web Tracking in Response to California Privacy 
Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-wont-change-web-
tracking-in-response-to-california-privacy-law-11576175345 [https://perma.cc/LR6Q-PP3Z] 
(contrasting Facebook’s position regarding the CCPA’s definition of “sale” with Google’s position). 
 272.  Interactive Advert. Bureau, IAB CCPA Compliance Framework for Publishers & Technology 
Companies Version 1.0, (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/IAB_CCPA-
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information without disrupting the above-described information ecosystem has 
drawn criticism from Californians for Consumer Privacy, which believes the IAB’s 
framework still runs afoul of consumers’ right to opt-out from sales.273   
Maine should avoid this confusion by clearly stating how the prospective 
consumer privacy law applies to business’s use of personal information in targeted 
advertising.  One option would be to create a specific right to opt-out from targeted 
advertising and to clearly explain what happens when a consumer exercises that 
right. In particular, the law should explain what personal information can and cannot 
be used for advertising purposes once a user opts-out.  The opt-out right could be 
structured such that platforms cannot use any personal information for targeting ads 
once a user opts-out.  Or, the opt-out could be narrowed such that platforms could 
still target ads based on a limited set of personal information that poses minimal 
privacy risks.274  Regardless of the ultimate contours of the opt-out right, the 
legislature should make those contours clear to avoid the type of uncertainty caused 
by the CCPA.   
Updating Maine’s Breach Notification Statute:  As part of a general consumer 
privacy law, Maine should update its data breach notification statute to provide 
consumers with greater protections in the event of a breach.  First, Maine should 
expand the statute’s definition of “personal information.”  Currently, the term only 
covers basic types of personal information that lead to a risk of identity theft when 
breached:  social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, account numbers and 
passwords, and the like.275  Companies that experience breaches of other types of 
personal information thus do not need to report the breach to consumers under Maine 
law.   
The scope of the statute’s definition of personal information made sense when 
it was enacted in 2005, as the legislature’s chief concern was preventing identity theft 
caused by data breaches.  However, companies today are collecting many more types 
of personal information and breaches of such information can have consequences 
beyond identity theft.  Other states thus maintain breach notification laws with 
definitions of personal information that encompass categories such as biometric 
information, DNA profiles, medical or health information, certain electronic 
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 275.  10 M.R.S.A. § 1347(6) (2019). 
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identifiers, digital signatures, and work evaluations.276  At a minimum, Maine should 
expand its definition of personal information to require companies to report breaches 
of biometric information, DNA profiles, and health information.  Consumers ought 
to know when an unauthorized party accesses these categories of deeply personal 
information.   
Second, Maine’s breach notification law does not provide a private right of 
action, relying instead on the DPFR or the Attorney General to protect consumers 
through enforcement actions.  Maine could empower consumers to vindicate their 
own rights by adopting the DPFR’s 2006 recommendation and providing a limited 
private right of action for actual damages caused by the failure to investigate or 
timely notify consumers of a breach.277  Many other states and territories already 
provide their residents with a private right of action for violations of data breach 




Fortunately, Maine already has a Maine-specific legislative model from which 
to draw in fashioning a consumer privacy law for the state.  During the committee 
proceedings for Maine’s ISP legislation, an amendment that would have replaced the 
bill with a general consumer privacy law was introduced and defeated.279  The 
amendment would have (1) imposed disclosure obligations on businesses that collect 
personal information,280 (2) given consumers rights to know and to opt-out similar 
to Californians’ parallel CCPA rights,281 (3) required businesses to conduct risk 
assessments regarding their use of personal information,282 and (4) allowed the 
Attorney General to enforce the law through civil actions.283  To be sure, this failed 
amendment would need revising to conform to the suggestions I offer here, but it 
presents a good foundation from which to build a law that adequately safeguards the 
privacy of Maine residents.   
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biometric information in the definition of “specific data element”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-
101(7)(a)(6), (8) (2018) (including medical information and biometric information); FLA. STAT. § 
501.171(1)(g)(1)(a)(IV) (2020) (including medical information); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
530/5(1)(D) (LexisNexis 2020) (including medical information); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(10) (2020); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(4)(a)(7), (10) (2019) (including medical information and digital 
signatures); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4051(a)(5), (7) (2020) (including medical information and work-
related evaluations); WIS. STAT. § 134.98(1)(b)(4)-(5) (2020) (including DNA profile and biometric 
data). 
 277.  See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text (discussing the DPFR’s report). 
 278.  See, e.g., Breach Notification Law Interactive Map, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, https:// 
www.bakerlaw.com/BreachNotificationLawMap [https://perma.cc/RL77-P9XY] (last visited Apr. 11, 
2021) (showing over a dozen states and territories that provide a private right of action). 
 279.  See An Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer Information: Hearing on L.D. 946 Before 
the Comm. on Energy, Utilities and Tech., 129th Legis. 112-118 (Me. 2019), available from Me. State 
Law & Leg. Reference Library by requesting cf129-LD-0946.pdf. 
 280.  Id. § 172(1). 
 281.  Id. § 172(2)-(3). 
 282.  Id. § 173. 
 283.  Id. § 176. 
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B. Mitigating Specific Privacy Threats 
To supplement a general consumer privacy law, Maine should continue to 
address privacy threats posed by emerging technologies, as the state has done 
repeatedly in the past.  Responses to new technologies can come in the form of 
amendments to the general consumer privacy law, additions or amendments to other 
sections of Maine law, or through regulations promulgated by the state agency vested 
with rulemaking authority under the general consumer privacy law.  In this Section, 
I identify five privacy threats caused or exacerbated by recent advances in 
technology that warrant a specific legislative or regulatory response from the state:  
(1) facial recognition technology; (2) biometric information; (3) smart-home 
devices; (4) data brokers; and (5) the Maine Information and Analysis Center.   
Facial Recognition Technology:  Facial recognition technology, or facial 
surveillance technology, “uses algorithms designed to analyze images of human 
faces” to allow the user to identify a person based on an image of their face.284  “In 
one form of facial surveillance technology,” for example, “a computer program 
analyzes an image of a person’s face, taking measurements of their facial features to 
create a unique ‘faceprint.’”285  These faceprints can then be used “in combination 
with databases like the driver’s license system at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles and 
surveillance camera networks, to identify and track people en masse.”286   
The technology poses serious risks to privacy and liberty when it is used by law 
enforcement and other government agencies.  Facial recognition can be paired with 
networks of public surveillance cameras to “easily and continuously track everyone’s 
public movements,” threatening the conditions that allow fundamental freedoms like 
speech, association, and religion.287  The technology can also exacerbate existing 
social inequities and create new ones.  For example, face surveillance systems used 
by law enforcement often compare images against mugshot databases.  Because 
Black and Latino people are historically more likely to be arrested than white people 
for committing the same crimes, “[u]sing mugshot databases for face surveillance 
searches exacerbates historical inequities by recycling that bias through new 
technology, and unfairly scrutinizing people who have long been targets of 
disproportionate police attention.”288  Recognizing these dangers, cities such as San 
Francisco, Oakland, and Boston have banned city agencies from using facial 
recognition technology, while other cities and states have implemented partial 
restrictions.289   
In Maine, the City of Portland has been a leader on this front.  The City Council 
                                                                                                     
 284.  Michael Kebede, An Open Letter to Portland City Council on Facial Recognition, ACLU OF 
ME. (Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.aclumaine.org/en/news/open-letter-portland-city-council-facial-
recognition [https://perma.cc/9UGS-UYGY]. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. (arguing that the use of face surveillance technologies poses a threat to First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  See id. (listing state localities that have banned law enforcement use of facial recognition 
technology); Ally Jarmanning, Boston Bans Use of Facial Recognition Technology. It's the 2nd-Largest 
City To Do So, WBUR (June 24, 2020), https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/06/23/boston-facial-
recognition-ban [https://perma.cc/Y6ZU-92B5]. 
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unanimously voted to ban the use of facial recognition technology by the city and by 
city officials in August 2020.290  Two months later, voters approved a ballot initiative 
that replaced the city’s prohibition on facial recognition technology in favor of a 
prohibition with more stringent enforcement mechanisms.291  The initiative, 
Question B, includes a private right of action against the City of Portland and 
includes a bar on using evidence obtained in violation of the section in court.292   
Maine should regulate government use of facial surveillance technology on the 
state level to create a uniform policy.  There is no reason why a person in Portland 
should have greater protections for their privacy than someone a couple miles down 
the road in Westbrook or a couple hundred miles up the road in Caribou.  Indeed, the 
legislature has already indicated that the privacy intrusions posed by facial 
surveillance technology require a state-level solution.  The state’s “Act to Protect the 
Privacy of Citizens from Domestic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” prohibits the use of 
facial recognition technology in drones.293  The legislature should extend that 
prohibition to all other mediums and prohibit the government from using facial 
recognition entirely.294   
Proponents of the technology may assert that the government should be allowed 
to install facial surveillance systems and to access the systems in emergency 
situations.  But, “emergency powers . . . tend to kindle emergencies.”295  In my view, 
the risk is too high that, if facial recognition technology is allowed to be deployed, 
established safeguards will be eroded and the creep of authoritarianism will persist.   
Biometric Information:  There is perhaps no type of information more personal 
than information about your person.296  New technologies can collect and use 
identifying information about your face, eyes, voice, and fingerprints; data about 
your sleep habits, breathing pattern, and heart rate; and even your unique human 
genome.297  These technologies have their benefits but carry attendant privacy risks.  
                                                                                                     
 290.  Portland, Me., Code §§ 17-129 to -132 (Aug. 3, 2020). 
 291.  Question B, An Act to Ban Facial Surveillance by Public Officials in Portland, PORTLAND, 
ME., https://www.portlandmaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/29039/Ballot-Question-Initiative-
language-Nov-2020 [https://perma.cc/R89Q-NUUD] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 292.  Id. § 17-132. 
 293.  Me. P.L. 2015, ch. 307, § 1 (codified at 25 M.R.S.A. § 4501(5)(D)). 
 294.  Like the City of Boston’s ban on facial surveillance technologies, narrow carve-outs can be 
established for using the technology for user authentication.  See Boston, Ma., Ordinance Docket 0683 
(June 24, 2020), Ordinance Banning Face Surveillance Technology in Boston, http://meetingrecords. 
cityofboston.gov/sirepub/mtgviewer.aspx?meetid=511&doctype=minutes&itemid=33202 [https:// 
perma.cc/QRR2-N39Z] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021) (codified at BOSTON, MA., MUN. CODE §16-62 
(2020)). 
 295.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 296.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has long interpreted the Constitution to include privacy protections 
for decisions about the body.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that 
the Constitution includes a right to privacy that protects a married couple's ability to be counseled in the 
use of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the Constitution’s right of 
privacy “is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”). 
 297.  See, e.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 236 (describing a “smart” mattress that collects data on 
users’ heart rates, breathing, and movements); id. at 246 (describing biometric data that can be collected 
through wearable technologies); IGO, supra note 2, at 359 (describing how biometric identifiers such as 
facial recognition, fingerprinting, retina scanning, voice spectrometry, and DNA typing have “migrated 
from criminal justice into the society at large in recent decades”); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the 
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Just like other types of personal information, biometric information collected by 
companies  can be used and shared for purposes beyond what consumers would 
reasonably expect.  Because the information is deeply personal and immutable, the 
harms posed by such misuses of biometric information can be substantial.   
These concerns have led Illinois, Washington, and Texas to specifically regulate 
the use of some biometric information.298  The most important of these laws is the 
Illinois “Biometric Information Privacy Act” (“BIPA”).  Unlike the biometric 
information privacy laws enacted by Washington and Texas, Illinois included a 
private right of action, which has led to suits against companies including Facebook, 
Google, and Shutterfly.299   
The BIPA defines biometric information to encompass information about retina 
or iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, and scans of the “hand or face geometry.”300  
The law imposes five restrictions on companies that collect such information.  First, 
companies must receive consent prior to collecting or otherwise obtaining biometric 
information.301  Second, companies are prohibited from selling or otherwise profiting 
from a person’s biometric information.302  Third, companies must obtain consent 
before disclosing biometric information to another party.303  Fourth, the law imposes 
a “reasonable standard of care” on companies to safeguard biometric information.304  
Finally, companies must maintain a written policy providing that biometric 
information be destroyed upon the earlier of:  (a) the date on which the original 
purpose for collecting the information has been satisfied; and (b) three years from 
the individual’s last interaction with the company.305   
Maine should enact a biometric information privacy law similar to the BIPA but 
with a broader definition of “biometric information.”  When Illinois enacted the 
BIPA it was chiefly concerned with the use of biometric information for identity 
verification in financial transactions and security screenings.306  These identity 
                                                                                                     
Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 
TEX. L. REV. 85, 88 (2014) (listing numerous devices that collect biometric information). 
 298.  For example, when Illinois enacted the state’s Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), the 
legislature expressed a particular concern for the privacy risks posed by requiring consumers to verify 
their identities via biometric information in order to access a financial account.  See 740 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. §§ 14/1-99 (2008).  “Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to access 
finances or other sensitive information.  For example, social security numbers, when compromised, can 
be changed.  Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once 
compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to 
withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.”  Id. § 14/5.  The legislature also declared that 
regulating biometric information as necessary because “[t]he full ramifications of biometric technology 
are not fully known.”  Id. 
 299.  In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Rivera v. 
Google, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Monroy v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 16 C 10984, 2017 
WL 4099846 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017). 
 300. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 14/10. 
 301.  See id. § 14/15(b). 
 302.  See id. § 14/15(c). 
 303.  See id. § 14/15(d).  This consent requirement contains narrow exceptions for certain financial 
transactions, disclosures required by law, and disclosures required by a warrant or subpoena.  Id. 
 304.  Id. § 14/15(e). 
 305.  See id. § 14/15(a). 
 306.  See id. § 14/5(a) (“The use of biometrics is growing in the business and security screening 
sectors and appears to promise streamlined financial transactions and security screenings.”). 
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verification services generally rely on the types of biometric information listed in the 
BIPA.  However, companies are now using a broader range of biometric information 
for a wider variety of purposes; a trend that is almost certain to continue.  Maine’s 
biometric information law should reflect this development.   
Smart-Home Devices:  The home has been considered the penultimate zone of 
privacy for centuries.307  In the common law and in American constitutional law, 
courts have employed the maxim that a “person’s house is their castle” to guard the 
home from unwanted government intrusions.308  The home is also expected to be 
secured from the intrusions of private parties.  Through the physical construction of 
homes with solid doors and window curtains to social customs like knocking before 
entering, our culture has made a home’s occupant the master of who may view and 
access their home’s interior.309  This authority is enshrined by trespass, nuisance, 
burglary, criminal invasion of privacy, and similar laws providing relief for 
unwanted intrusions on real property.   
In recent years, the sanctuary of the home has come under threat from a growing 
body of devices that collect information from the home’s interior.  These smart-home 
devices include internet-connected security systems, lights, refrigerators, heating and 
cooling systems, vacuums, televisions, door-locks, and more.310  Smart-home 
devices collect data from the home and transmit that data to the device manufacturer 
who can monetize it in several ways.311  For example, in 2017 iRobot announced that 
                                                                                                     
 307.  See, e.g., William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Speech on the Excise Bill, House of Commons (Mar. 
1763) (“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.  It may be frail; 
its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King 
of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!”), quoted in 
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958). 
 308.  See, e.g., Miller, 357 U.S. at 306-07 (“From earliest days, the common law drastically limited 
the authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an arrest.  Such action invades the 
precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle.”); Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1980) (“The zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a ‘man's 
house is his castle,’ made it abundantly clear that both in England and in the Colonies ‘the freedom of 
one’s house’ was one of the most vital elements of English liberty.”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 
103, 115 (2006) (“We have . . . lived our whole national history with an understanding of ‘the ancient 
adage that a man's house is his castle . . . .’”).  I have intentionally removed the gendered language from 
the adage in the body of this article to avoid perpetuating its inherent sexism.  I have left the original 
language in the cases cited in this footnote for historical accuracy. 
 309.  Customs regarding household privacy vary by culture.  In Privacy and Freedom, Westin 
describes a contemporaneous study of Javanese households to provide a contrast to household privacy 
norms in the U.S.  In Java, “[t]he houses face the street with a cleared front yard in front of them.  There 
are no walls or fences around them, the house walls are thinly and loosely woven, and there are 
commonly not even doors.  Within the house people wander freely just about any place any time, and 
even outsiders wander in fairly freely almost any time during the day and early evening.”  WESTIN, 
supra note 2, at 16 (quoting a study by Clifford Geertz comparing household-privacy practices in Bali 
and Java).  However, even in societies where persons freely enter each other’s homes, “there will 
usually be rules limiting what a person may touch or where he may go within the house.  There will also 
be norms limiting family conversation or acts performed while the outsiders are present.”  Id. at 15. 
 310.  Smart-home devices constitute a subset of devices that are commonly referred to as the 
“Internet of Things” (IoT).  See, e.g., Peppet, supra note 297, at 88-89 (listing IoT devices including 
household devices such as thermostats, ovens, refrigerators, and home electricity and water-usage 
trackers). 
 311.  See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center to the 
FTC on the Privacy and Security Implications of the Internet of Things, 12 (June 1, 2013), 
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it would monetize floor plans of consumers’ homes created from the Roomba’s 
mapping technology.312  The company then equipped the vacuum with new sensors, 
cameras, and software to facilitate its mapping function.313  Vizio used its line of 
smart TVs to capture billions of data points about users’ viewing habits then sold 
users’ viewing histories to advertisers and others.314  By 2015, Samsung’s smart TVs 
were “recording everything said in the vicinity of the TV” and sending the recordings 
to be transcribed by a third party.315  A participant in the FTC’s 2015 study on the 
“Internet of Things” (“IoT”) shared that fewer than 10,000 households using their 
company’s interior-home device generated 150 million data points, or 
“approximately one data point every six seconds for each household.”316   
The astounding amount of personal data collected from the home’s interior by 
smart-home appliances is surpassed only by another type of smart-home device:  the 
digital personal assistant.  A digital personal assistant serves two primary functions 
for the user.  First, it is the central nervous system for the home’s other smart-home 
devices.  The personal assistant integrates with the home’s smart lights, cameras, 
locks, and appliances such that a user can control all these things with a voice 
command—“Hey Google, turn on the lights.” “Hey Alexa, change the channel.”  
Second, the personal assistant allows the user to conduct a variety of daily tasks 
through voice commands, including searching the internet, playing music, ordering 
goods, calling friends, and more.   
These functions combine to allow the companies that produce digital personal 
assistants to monetize data about “a theoretically limitless scope of animate and 
inanimate domestic activities:  conversations, lightbulbs, queries, schedules, 
movement, travel planning, heating systems, purchases, home security, health 
concerns, music, communication functions, and more.”317  Conversations and 
activities once thought to occur in the sanctuary of the home are thus “eagerly 
rendered as surplus” to be sold by the titans of industry to advertisers and other 
purchasers who may find such data useful.318   
To be sure, homeowners willingly put these devices in their homes and often 
                                                                                                     
https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/EPIC-FTC-IoT-Cmts.pdf [https://perma.cc/NKS4-B8NN] [hereinafter “EPIC 
Comments”] (“Smart devices could reveal a wealth of information about consumers’ location, media 
consumption, activity patterns, associations, lifestyle, age, income, gender, race, and health—
information with potential commercial value.  Companies might attempt to exploit this data by using it 
to target advertising or selling it directly.”). 
 312.  ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 235; see also Josh Hafner & Edward C. Baig, Your Roomba 
Already Maps Your Home. Now the CEO Plans to Sell the Map, USA TODAY (July 25, 2017, 12:36 
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2017/07/25/roomba-plans-sell-maps-users-
homes/508578001/ [https://perma.cc/8YW7-F35U] (quoting iRobot CEO Colin Angle as declaring that 
“there's an entire ecosystem of things and services that the smart home can deliver once you have a rich 
map of the home that the user has allowed to be shared”). 
 313.  ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 235; Hafner & Baid, supra note 312. 
 314.  ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 265. 
 315.  Id. at 264. 
 316.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD 
14 (FTC Staff Report 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/27QR-JJQJ] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 317.  ZUBOFF, supra note 122, at 262. 
 318.  Id. at 261. 
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find the devices beneficial or convenient.  But this is no defense to the privacy 
intrusions posed by smart-home devices.  Homeowners may not appreciate the extent 
to which the devices collect information or the extent to which companies use and 
share the information.  In this sense, the devices exceed the scope of the owner’s 
invitation into their home like a houseguest who snoops through their drawers or 
surreptitiously records their dinner conversation.  They may also create an avenue 
for hackers to access the home’s interior; a house-sitter who fails to safeguard your 
keys, if you will.319   
Careful regulation is necessary to protect privacy in the home while also 
allowing homeowners to enjoy the benefits of smart-home devices.  While there are 
different ways to strike this balance, I suggest incorporating three elements into 
legislation or regulation governing smart-home devices.   
First, companies should be required to obtain consumers’ express opt-in consent 
before using data from smart-home devices for secondary purposes such as targeted 
advertising or sales to third parties.  Such uses are simply not in line with consumers’ 
reasonable expectations and consumers should not be required to submit to having 
their interior-home data sold as a condition for using a smart-home device.  This 
consent requirement could be paired with an anti-discrimination protection such that 
if the consumer declines to consent to the secondary use, the device must still 
function to the extent possible.320   
Second, Maine should establish a data-minimization requirement for smart-
home devices.  Companies should only be allowed to collect information that is 
necessary or desirable for device functionality and improvement.321  Your 
refrigerator probably does not need to record your conversations, track your music 
preferences, or log your travel schedule.   
Third, if the state does not enact a general consumer privacy law that requires 
companies to take reasonable security measures and grants a private right of action 
for data breaches caused by a violation of that duty, the state should impose such a 
requirement on companies that produce smart-home devices given the security risks 
posed by a third-party gaining access to a consumer’s locks, security cameras, 
thermostat, and more.322   
Data Brokers:  Data brokers are businesses that amass consumer personal 
information from sources other than consumers themselves and then sell that 
                                                                                                     
 319.  See Hayley Peterson, Wisconsin Couple Describe the Chilling Moment That a Hacker Cranked 
Up Their Heat and Started Talking to Them Through a Google Nest Camera in Their Kitchen, BUS. 
INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/hacker-breaks-into-smart-home-
google-nest-devices-terrorizes-couple-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/M7NY-D8VX]; Stephen Gandel, 
Hackers Target Home Security Cameras: “I'm Coming for Your Baby”, CBS NEWS (Dec. 13, 2019, 
3:37 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ring-and-nest-hackers-home-security-cameras-vulnerable-to-
cyberattacks/ [https://perma.cc/6GQU-ZMQM]. 
 320.  See EPIC Comments, supra note 311, at 18 (proposing a consent requirement and arguing that 
for consent to be effective “companies must not be allowed to condition use of a service on unnecessary 
data collection”). 
 321.  See id. at 20 (proposing a data minimization requirement). 
 322.  California recently enacted legislation requiring all IoT devices to have reasonable security 
features.  The legislation does not include a private right of action.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.91.04–.06 
(West 2020). 
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personal information to third parties.323  These companies collect data from public 
records, other publicly available sources, and commercial databases.324 They then 
supplement this data with “certain derived data, which they infer about 
consumers.”325  For instance, “a data broker might infer that an individual with a 
boating license has an interest in boating.”326  By combining this collected and 
inferred information, data brokers can build detailed profiles of nearly every 
American adult, which can then be packaged into marketable products.   
A 2014 Federal Trade Commission report examined nine data brokers who offer 
marketing products, risk mitigation products, or “people search” products.  The 
marketing products allow companies to purchase information about their customers 
(or potential customers) to facilitate marketing efforts and to analyze their customer-
base’s data to improve ad targeting.327  Risk mitigation products assist companies in 
confirming their customers’ identities or in assessing the likelihood a particular 
transaction is fraudulent.328  For example,  
data brokers offer their clients a quiz product, which typically includes questions to 
which the answers should be easily known to the consumer, but would not likely 
appear in information stolen by an identity thief . . . .  Questions might include:  
“Which of these is an email address you have used?” or “What is your mother’s 
birthday?”329   
Lastly, “people-search” products allow users to search the data brokers’ 
information database to locate information about a particular person.330  Database 
information may include court records, property records, social media information, 
demographic information, and employment history.331   
The amount of information data brokers collect and infer to create these products 
is truly astounding.  “[O]ne data broker’s database has information on 1.4 billion 
consumer transactions and over 700 billion aggregated data elements . . . another 
data broker adds three billion new records each month to its databases, . . . [while 
another] has 3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. consumer.”332   
The FTC’s report confirmed the obvious:  data brokers pose significant privacy 
                                                                                                     
 323.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.99.80(d) (West 2020) (defining “data broker” as “a business 
that knowingly collects and sells to third parties the personal information of a consumer with whom the 
business does not have a direct relationship”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2014) [hereinafter “FTC DATA BROKERS REPORT”] 
(defining “data brokers” as “companies whose primary business is collecting personal information about 
consumers from a variety of sources and aggregating, analyzing, and sharing that information, or 
information derived from it, for purposes such as marketing products, verifying an individual’s identity, 
or detecting fraud”). 
 324. FTC DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 323, at 11-14 (concluding that data brokers collect 
data from three categories of sources:  government sources, other publicly available sources, and 
commercial sources). 
 325.  Id. at ii. 
 326.  Id. 
 327.  Id. at 23-31 (detailing the various marketing products offered by data brokers). 
 328.  Id. at 32. 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  Id. at 34. 
 331.  Id. (listing the particular types of information available to users through a people search). 
 332.  Id. at 46-47. 
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risks for consumers.333  They piece together a wealth of personal information from 
numerous sources to create a “detailed composite of the consumer’s life,” and they 
do so without the consumer’s knowledge.334  When they use this information to 
design marketing products, they group consumers into different categories—
including categories that track ethnicity and income level—or assign them different 
“scores” based on their personal information.335  These groupings dictate what 
advertisements consumers see, which can in turn impact which products they buy 
and what services they receive.336  When data brokers use their troves of personal 
information to create people-search products, they could be “facilitat[ing] 
harassment, or even stalking, and may expose domestic violence victims, law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, public officials, or other individuals to retaliation 
or other harm.”337  And, regardless of how they use the data, storing such large 
quantities of personal information inherently carries privacy risks attendant to a 
breach.338  This is a fact that approximately 250 Mainers learned first-hand during 
the ChoicePoint data breach that led the state to enact its breach notification law.   
Two states have enacted laws governing data brokers in response to these 
privacy concerns.  Vermont was the first state to do so when, in 2017, it enacted 
legislation creating a data broker registry.339  Data brokers are required to annually 
register with the Vermont Secretary of State, to provide the company’s contact 
information, and to provide information about whether and how a consumer can opt-
out from the collection or sale of personal information.340  The Secretary of State 
then publishes this information in a publicly available, online database so that anyone 
can contact the data broker.341  Importantly, the data broker registry is only a 
transparency measure.  It does not create a right to opt-out from the collection or sale 
of personal information; Vermont law only requires data brokers to be transparent 
about whether consumers can opt-out, what activity they can opt-out of (e.g., 
collection or sales), and what they need to do to opt-out.342   
                                                                                                     
 333.  The FTC’s conclusion that data brokers’ practices result in intrusions to consumers’ privacy is 
shared by consumers themselves.  The results of an empirical study published in 2017 show that 
consumers are deeply uncomfortable with data-brokers accessing their personal information, even when 
that information comes from a public source.  See Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy 
Interests in Public Records: An Empirical Investigation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 140 (2017) 
(“Accessing [public record] information through the use of a data broker is consistently perceived as 
inappropriate, even when the type of information accessed and the receiver of the information are 
judged to be appropriate.”). 
 334.  FTC DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra note 323, at 46. 
 335.  Id. at 47-48 (noting data-brokers’ scoring system and listing groups such as “‘Urban Scramble’ 
and ‘Mobile Mixers,’ both of which include a high concentration of Latinos and African Americans with 
low incomes”). 
 336.  See id. at 48 (noting that a low score could result in a consumer being “limited to ads for 
subprime credit or receiving different levels of service from companies”). 
 337.  Id. 
 338.  Id. at 48-49 (“[I]dentity thieves and other unscrupulous actors may be attracted to the collection 
of consumer profiles that would give them a clear picture of consumers’ habits over time, thereby 
enabling them to predict passwords, challenge questions, or other authentication credentials.”). 
 339.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2446 (2019) (creating a data broker registry). 
 340.  Id. at § 2446(a). 
 341.  See Vermont Data Broker Registry, https://bizfilings.vermont.gov/online/DatabrokerInquire/ 
[https://perma.cc/5FPF-LW54] (last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 342.  VT. STAT. ANN. § 2446(a)(3)(B)(i)-(iii). 
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In addition to the registration requirement, the Vermont law imposes affirmative 
information-security obligations on data brokers and creates a private right of action 
for violations of the security requirements.343  The law also prohibits the acquisition 
of brokered personal information through fraudulent means, for purposes of stalking 
or harassment, for purposes of discriminating, or for committing fraud.344  
Consumers have a private right of action to enforce these prohibitions.345   
More recently, California amended the CCPA to create a data broker registry.346  
The registry requires data brokers to list:  (a) their name and contact information; 
and (b) “[a]ny additional information or explanation the data broker chooses to 
provide concerning its data collection practices.”347  The amendment does not create 
any new rights for consumers, though the CCPA already provides them the right to 
opt-out from the sale of their personal information.348   
Maine should adopt a law similar to Vermont’s and California’s and require data 
brokers to annually register with the Secretary of State.  Establishing a registry is an 
important transparency measure.  Since data brokers collect information from third-
party sources, consumers need a registry to know which companies to contact about 
opting out of the collection or sale of their personal information.   
Other desirable features of a Maine data broker law depend on whether the state 
also enacts a general consumer privacy law, and on what rights and obligations that 
law respectively creates for consumers and businesses.  Whether located in a general 
consumer privacy law or a specific data broker law, the state should ensure that 
residents have the right to know what personal information data brokers collect and 
sell.349  Maine law could also empower residents to opt-out from data brokers 
building profiles about them for marketing purposes, from data brokers selling their 
personal information, and from data brokers disclosing their compiled information 
to the public in people-search products.350  This latter right—the right to opt-out from 
being listed in people-search products—is particularly important for victims of 
cyber-harassment and stalking that the legislature has repeatedly acted to protect.  
                                                                                                     
 343.  See id. § 2447 (detailing the security requirements and stating that “[a] person who violates a 
provision of this section commits an unfair and deceptive act in commerce in violation” of Vermont’s 
consumer protection laws). 
 344.  See id. § 2431. 
 345.  Id. § 2431(b)(1). 
 346.  See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.99.80–.88 (West 2020). 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  See supra Section (II)(A)(2) (discussing the individual rights created by the CCPA). 
 349.  This recommendation aligns with the FTC’s recommendation that Congress consider legislation 
requiring data brokers to give consumers access to their data.  See FTC DATA BROKERS REPORT, supra 
note 323, at 50. 
 350.  The FTC report also recommended that consumers be allowed to opt-out from having their data 
shared for marketing purposes and from being listed in “people search” results.  Id. at 50, 54.  The FTC 
recommends giving consumers other rights as well, including a right to correct inaccurate information 
contained in a “people search” listing.  Id. at 54.  The FTC recommendations regarding risk mitigation 
products are more circumscribed, focusing on increasing transparency rather than vesting consumers 
with opt-out rights.  Id. at 53-54.  Data brokers’ use of personal information to create risk mitigation 
products present less privacy risks and pose greater benefits to consumers than do the other ways in 
which data brokers use personal information.  In balancing these risks and benefits, providing 
consumers a right to opt-out from data brokers’ use of publicly available information for risk mitigation 
products is likely not necessary at this time. 
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Finally, Maine could create a universal opt-out list, much like the National Do Not 
Call Registry.351  Creating such a list would allow residents to exercise their opt-out 
rights for all data brokers at once, rather than having to navigate the opt-out process 
for each broker individually.   
The Maine Information and Analysis Center (“MIAC”):  The MIAC is a law 
enforcement information-sharing center established by executive order and operated 
jointly by the Maine Emergency Management Agency and the Maine State Police.352  
Known as a “fusion center,” the MIAC is one cog in a national network of 
information-sharing centers established in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to improve 
the nation’s intelligence-sharing practices.353  Following that tragedy, “policymakers 
argued that government agencies could have prevented the attacks if they had 
‘connected the dots’ by synthesizing and analyzing available information.”354  The 
creation of fusion centers to collect and share information between local, state, 
federal, and private-sector sources was a response to this perceived shortcoming.355   
In the two decades since 9/11, fusion centers have become the target of frequent 
criticism regarding both their effectiveness as an intelligence tool and their intrusions 
on individual liberties.  Critics assert that the increase in digital information sharing 
fostered by fusion centers does not, “actually lead[] to more actionable intelligence 
than it impedes.”356  The glut of information can instead make it difficult for analysts 
to distinguish relevant from irrelevant information, and accurate leads from 
inaccurate leads, amounting to a massive waste of valuable time and resources.357  
Indeed, a U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
investigation failed to identify a single instance where a fusion center helped to 
identify a terrorist threat or to disrupt an active terrorist plot.358   
                                                                                                     
 351.  Fed. Trade Comm’n, National Do Not Call Registry, https://donotcall.gov [https://perma.cc/ 
9B4P-S7AQ](last visited Apr. 11, 2021). 
 352.  Me. Exec. Order No. 24 FY 06/07 (Dec. 8, 2006) (“An Order Establishing the Maine 
Intelligence Analysis Center”), https://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=Gov_ 
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Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1448 (2011). 
 355.  Id. 
 356.  Id. at 1456. 
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from more effective crime-fighting endeavors.  Amidst the false positives, analysts may find it difficult 
to find relevant information.  They also spend valuable time investigating innocent individuals.”). 
 358.  U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFS., FED. SUPPORT FOR AN INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 2 
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McQuade, Investigate and Shut Down the Maine Information and Analysis Center, BANGOR DAILY 
NEWS (June 13, 2020), https://bangordailynews.com/2020/06/13/opinion/contributors/investigate-and-
shut-down-the-maine-information-and-analysis-center/ [https://perma.cc/EHX5-DHZU] (quoting the 
U.S. Senate Committee investigation in support of the proposition that fusion centers are a “failed 
policy”); see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 354, at 1456 (“Although fusion centers have 
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From the civil liberties perspective, three related factors have spurred calls for 
reform.  First, the scope of fusion centers’ missions have drastically expanded from 
their counter-terrorism origins to encompass all types of general crime prevention.359  
This “mission creep” has led to concerns that the post-9/11 state of emergency 
originally used to justify the centers’ creation has normalized what amounts to a 
domestic surveillance program.360  Second, the massive volume of information 
shared within and between fusion centers has led to privacy concerns common to 
most any large government database:  Is the collection, use, storage, and sharing of 
information transparent, appropriate, and secure, and what recourse do people have 
if information about them is inaccurate or incomplete?361  Third, fusion centers have 
regularly conducted surveillance on groups engaging in protest activities, leading to 
concerns that they pose a threat to First Amendment speech and associational 
rights.362   
These civil liberty and privacy concerns came to a head in Maine during the 
summer of 2020.  On May 7, 2020, a Maine State Trooper filed a complaint in federal 
district court alleging that the MIAC retaliated against him for blowing the whistle 
on the MIAC’s illegal surveillance activity.363  The complaint alleged that the MIAC 
“completely ignores its own privacy policy, the federal Privacy Act, and that it 
regularly engages in violations of state law, federal law, and rules of criminal 
procedure.”364  This alleged misconduct includes collecting, retaining, and sharing 
data on “individuals associated with lawful public protests . . . .”365  For example, the 
MIAC allegedly monitored protests against CMP’s transmission line project and 
                                                                                                     
contributed to crime-fighting in cases where they assist ongoing investigations, they have generated 
little valuable intelligence about future threats, crimes, or hazards.”). 
 359.  See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 354, at 1463-65 (describing how fusion centers have 
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 363.  Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at ¶¶ 13-16, Loder v. Me. Intel. Analysis Ctr., No. 2:20-cv-
00157-JDL (D. Me. May 7, 2020). 
 364.  Id. at ¶¶ 57, 63. 
 365.  Id. ¶59. 
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shared its information with CMP.366  The MIAC also allegedly maintains records 
about gun owners indefinitely, in violation of federal and state law.367  And, the 
MIAC allegedly compiled information on individuals connected with a summer 
camp, Seeds of Peace, which hosts foreign teenagers from international conflict 
areas.368   
The second shoe dropped a month later when an online “hactivist” group 
published a trove of law enforcement documents obtained from servers owned by a 
website developer called Netsential.369  The so-called “Blueleaks” hack included 
numerous documents from the MIAC.  Among other issues, these documents 
revealed that the MIAC was closely monitoring Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) 
protests across the state.  The documents included compilations of the times and 
places of protests, misleading information about an incident that occurred at one 
protest, and the documents showed that the MIAC had shared unverified anti-BLM 
information emanating from far right-wing Twitter accounts.370  The MIAC’s 
monitoring of, and spread of misinformation about, BLM protests suggests a 
“political nature” to MIAC’s surveillance practices.371  The concern that the MIAC’s 
monitoring of protests has political underpinnings carries particular weight in the 
context of a movement sparked by police brutality, whose organizers have called for 
defunding police departments, and who many law enforcement officials see as being 
anti-police.   
These revelations have prompted calls to reform or defund the MIAC.  Brendan 
McQuade, an Assistant Professor of Criminology at the University of Southern 
Maine and author of a book on fusion centers, has called for the MIAC to be shut 
down.372  State Representative Charlotte Warren, the Chair of the House’s Criminal 
Justice Committee, has called for the MIAC to be defunded.373  And, the editorial 
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boards of the state’s two largest newspapers have both called for investigations and 
reforms for the MIAC.374   
I add my voice to this chorus.  As this Article goes to print, Maine’s legislature 
is considering a bill to defund the MIAC.375  Given the aforementioned abuses, the 
legislature should pass this bill and the Governor should sign it into law.376   
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the late 1960s, Maine began developing a body of privacy law to protect its 
residents from privacy risks posed by the likes of eavesdroppers, harassers, 
wiretappers, private investigators, and consumer reporting agencies.  The state has 
since expanded upon these foundational privacy protections to account for advances 
in technology.  During the 1990s and early 2000s, Maine criminalized unauthorized 
computer access, prohibited cyberstalking, expanded the state’s criminal invasion of 
privacy law, enacted a data breach law, prohibited the sale of consumers’ cell phone 
records, and more.  In the years since, Maine has enacted targeted reforms aimed at 
specific privacy intrusions that have emerged during the current era of social media, 
big data, and machine learning, curtailing the privacy risks caused by ISPs, education 
technologies, drones, social media in employment, and unauthorized sexual images.   
These recent reforms should be viewed as just the beginning of Maine’s efforts 
to protect its residents against the day’s privacy threats.  Personal information has 
become a valuable resource that drives a significant portion of the country’s 
economy.  As with natural resources like oil, gas, and minerals, the titans of industry 
have strong financial incentives to gather, process, market, and exploit more and 
more of the new resource.  If this industry continues to be left virtually unchecked, 
the mass-commoditization of personal information will lead Mainers and other 
Americans to experience unprecedented harms to their privacy.   
This is no longer a case where “technology got a couple of steps ahead of us,” 
as Senator Bartlett remarked while discussing the state’s Cellular Telephone 
Customer Privacy Act.377  An entire system of economic production has gotten a 
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couple steps ahead of us.  Maine should correct this lag by enacting a general 
consumer privacy law with the features described in this Article.  Most importantly, 
the law should endow a state agency with rulemaking authority over consumer 
privacy issues such that the state can adapt its laws to changing industry practices 
and new technologies.  Maine should also continue to regulate specific threats posed 
by emerging technologies.  Facial recognition technology, biometric information, 
smart-home devices, data brokers, and the MIAC all pose privacy threats that the 
state should address through specific regulation, legislation, or executive action.   
To be sure, this era’s privacy risks are national—and indeed global—in scope; 
they require national and international solutions.  But Maine should not leave its 
residents’ privacy unguarded while waiting patiently for a federal response that may 
not come or may be too little, too late.   
 
